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Public goodsIntroduction
The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in Sep-
tember 2015 includes the goal to end global energy poverty by provid-
ing universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all. In the academic literature, rural electriﬁcation, deﬁned
as percentage of the rural population with access to electricity, has
been found to be a crucial part of socio-economic development (Cook,
2011). An increase in rural electriﬁcation is associated with higher
youth literacy rates by upgrading in-school and domestic learning facil-
ities (Kanagawa andNakata, 2008). It has been linked to improving am-
bulant and nursing care (Herrin, 1979). Furthermore, it has been found
to enhance employment, especially among women (Dinkelman, 2011),
enable additional agricultural and non-agricultural income generating
activities, and advance rural productivity (Kirubi et al., 2009). Where
complementary hard and soft infrastructure are present, access to elec-
tricity is generally accepted to result in such positive health, education
and income consequences (Cook, 2011).
Electriﬁcation rates diverge substantially in different world regions.
Fig. 1 shows rural and urban electriﬁcation rates for sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) and East Asia & Paciﬁc. It exhibits two striking features. First,
sub-Saharan Africa's rural electriﬁcation of 14% is signiﬁcantly lowervier Inc. on behalf of Internatiothan in any other region of the world. Second, the evident urban bias
in electriﬁcation measured as ratio between rural and urban electriﬁca-
tion is 3.5 times greater in sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else (cf.
Mandelli et al., 2014; Ahlborg et al., 2015).
However, within sub-Saharan Africa unparalleled and growing
cross-national variations exist in both rural electriﬁcation and rural
versus urban electriﬁcation inequality. The standard deviation of
rural electriﬁcation in the region has increased by almost 50% be-
tween 1990 and 2010. During this period, countries like Ghana and
Senegal managed to increase rural electriﬁcation and decrease the
urban electriﬁcation bias by an order of magnitude (World Bank,
2015). Yet they are contrasted by cases with more dubious trajecto-
ries. In Swaziland, electriﬁcation inequality has risen despite its
middle-income status. In Rwanda, a strong urban bias exists in elec-
triﬁcation. New rural electriﬁcation connections in Uganda have not
managed to grow quicker than the rural population, resulting in a
stagnation of rural electriﬁcation rates at less than 5% and a greater
total number of rural residents without electricity despite consistent
income growth rates (Bhattacharyya, 2013).
This paper contributes to a growing socio-politically orientated liter-
ature on electriﬁcation in developing countries (Ahlborg et al., 2015;
Brown and Mobarak, 2009; Kroth et al., 2014; Min, 2015). It explicitly
focuses on rural areas and the salient inequality between rural and
urban electriﬁcation, aiming to analyse the importance of respective po-
litical, economic and demographic variables. It further intends to pro-
vide explicit multi-variant evidence for the existence of potentialnal Energy Initiative. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
1 Harding and Stasavage (2014) furthermore express the general concern that when
implementation agents are required to deliver a government's promise, a non-delivery
of the promise is not directly attributable to the government butmay be due toweak state
capacity. However, if the delivery apparatus is centrally controlled under heavy state inﬂu-
ence or run by the state itself, voters can attribute both a failure in delivery per se and the
failure to deliver on the promise in general to the government (see Harding, 2015; Min,
2015).
Fig. 1. Rural and urban electriﬁcation in 2010 (data source: World Bank, 2015).
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dent variables.
In the early 1990s, most sub-Saharan African countries introduced
multiparty elections, propelling the region's democratisation process
(Bates et al., 2012). Democracies have been found to spend more
money on public services such as education and health (Brown and
Hunter, 2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Stasavage, 2005).
A few studies have focused on tangible outcomes rather than budget al-
locations (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2013;
Kroth et al., 2014; Lake and Baum, 2001). They similarly observe that
democracies perform better at providing public services. Despite this
suggested link, the fact that around 60% of the sub-Saharan electorate
lives in rural areas, and the concurrence of increased cross-sectional
rural electriﬁcation and electriﬁcation inequality variations with a sa-
lient democratisation process, no previous study has jointly analysed
political, economic and demographic factors of rural electriﬁcation and
electricity access inequality in sub-Saharan Africa over time.
Econometric panel data and ordinary least squares (OLS) models in
this paper use electriﬁcation data from 46 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries between 1990 and 2010. The association between democracy
and rural electriﬁcation is studied in panel data models controlling for
a variety of political, economic and demographic variables. The multi-
variant approach then compares the democracy variable in econometric
basemodels to thosewhere additional political variables for opposition-
al strength in elections and institutional effectiveness are added to the
same observation set. A decrease in the democracy variable coefﬁcient,
coupled with respective statistical signiﬁcance levels, would constitute
explicit evidence for contested elections or institutional effectiveness
explaining parts of democracy's association with rural electriﬁcation.
The model results are reinforced by a series of econometric robustness
tests as well as by both factual and counterfactual case example evi-
dence from Ghana, Swaziland, Uganda, Senegal and Rwanda, the latter
two being provided in the Appendices B–C.
The Rural electriﬁcation in sub-Saharan Africa section of this paper
deduces eight testable hypotheses regarding political, economic and de-
mographic drivers of rural electriﬁcation in sub-Saharan Africa. The
Data and descriptive statistics section discusses data sources and as-
sumptions, followed by the econometric analyses entailing modelling
approach, regression results and robustness tests in the Econometric
analyses section. Qualitative evidence for three country cases is present-
ed in the Case example analyses section, before the paper closes with a
conclusion and policy implications.
Rural electriﬁcation in sub-Saharan Africa
Political drivers of rural electriﬁcation
Scholars have produced a range of studies showing a positive associ-
ation between democracy and public service provision (see for instance
Brown, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Kaufman and
Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Kudamatsu, 2012; Lake and Baum, 2001).Harding and Stasavage (2014) point out that whether the provision of
a certain public good is attributable to politicians' actions is a crucial
prerequisite for such a positive association to have potential implica-
tions. They argue that in a context of democratisation, politicians tend
to prioritise actions on those public goods where their executive effort
can be clearly connected to actual beneﬁts on the ground. While to
some extend dependent on context, following Harding's (2015) theory
on road networks in Ghana, three factors render rural electriﬁcation at-
tributable to executive efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. First, responsibility
for national electricity infrastructure is highly centralised and bundled
within the state apparatus (Barnes and Floor, 1996). To the best of the
author's knowledge, there is no sub-Saharan African country where
the state does not exercise a signiﬁcant amount of control over its elec-
tricity infrastructure, often through state-owned enterprises, state-run
electriﬁcation agencies and public grid ownership (Foster and
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010; Karekezi andKimani, 2002). The engineering
problem ofmatching national electricity demand and supply via one in-
terconnected national grid demands such centralised control. Electriﬁ-
cation agencies tend to feature explicit and publically available
planning criteria (Eberhard et al., 2011). Despite their signiﬁcant un-
tapped potential, decentralised electric capacity in sub-Saharan Africa,
often installed by non-governmental actors (MacLean et al., 2015), are
several orders of magnitude smaller than national grid extensions
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012).1 Second, somewhat
contrary to popular belief, the power sector in sub-Saharan Africa is
largely domestically ﬁnanced, easing attribution of political electriﬁca-
tion promises for its citizens. The World Bank in their 2010 Africa's In-
frastructure report shows that between 2001 and 2006, 81% of the
total electricity infrastructure spend in sub-Saharan Africa came from
sub-Saharan African taxpayers and infrastructure users (Foster and
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). Only 6%, or $0.7 bn. annually, came from of-
ﬁcial development assistance (ODA) which includes concessional loans.
Third, unlike other more qualitative public goods such as schooling
quality, rural electriﬁcation is easily veriﬁable for the affected popula-
tion as they have perfect information whether electric infrastructure is
available to themor not (Mani andMukand, 2007). As these factors gen-
erally suggest that rural electriﬁcation is attributable to political action
in sub-Saharan Africa, it represents an intriguing variable to study
across political systems in terms of its provision.
A small number of academic studies have addressed political drivers
of electriﬁcation in developing countries. Brown and Mobarak (2009)
argue that election-related incentives in low-income democracies in-
crease the relative share of electricity provided to residential versus in-
dustrial consumers. Yet they neither address electricity access nor do
they distinguish between rural and urban residential areas. Ahlborg
et al. (2015) use data from 44 sub-Saharan African countries over a
13-year time period and ﬁnd democracy and institutional quality to be
positively associatedwith household electricity consumption. However,
albeit acknowledging their signiﬁcance, they do not examine rural ver-
sus urban electriﬁcation disparities or rural electriﬁcation per se. Min
(2015) contends that electriﬁcation decisions in developing countries
are inﬂuenced by electoral considerations. His cross-sectional econo-
metric model for the year 2003 suggests a positive link between demo-
cratic history and country-wide electriﬁcation. Kroth et al. (2014) argue
that added voter enfranchisement during South Africa's post-Apartheid
democratisation increased rural electriﬁcation, mediated via citizenry
participation and the liberalisation of political organisations. Theseﬁnd-
ings corroborate themore general positive association between democ-
racy and public service provision (Brown, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et
2 The centrality of largely state-controlled decision-making in electriﬁcation in sub-
Saharan Africa, though curiously absent in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou's (2013) ex-
planation of their ﬁndings, further strengthens such an expectation.
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suggesting the below hypothesis.
HPol1. More democratic political systems should increase rural electriﬁ-
cation and decrease rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Amechanism often invoked regarding this argument is the presence
of contested elections creating incentives for governments to target
broad population shares. Electoral politics in democratising states
have long been employed to challenge urban-bias arguments, such as
those advocated by Bates (1981), as parties tend to ruralise over time
(see for instance Varshney (1993) or Colburn (1993) for empirical evi-
dence). Such a mechanism informs both the ﬁrst and the second part
of HPol1. As the median voter in sub-Saharan African countries usually
lives in rural areas, rural public service demands rank higher on the po-
litical agenda (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) compared to authoritarian
regimes where distributive mechanisms often follow more narrow pa-
tronage networks (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). In democracies,
this implies higher political incentives to extend electricity infrastruc-
ture to previously unserved rural areas with miniscule per capita de-
mand rather than improving existing grid infrastructure to improve
reliability of the comparably few citizens already served. In Min's
(2015) terms, the extension of rural infrastructure generates greater po-
litical externalities for politicians who wish to be re-elected. However,
such a mechanism of creating incentives for politicians through
contested elections is commonly not explicitlymodelled as an interven-
ing step between democracy and public service provision in economet-
ric analyses. Rather, it is deduced from either a single regime type
variable (Bates et al., 2012; Brown and Mobarak, 2009; Min, 2015) or
a single contested election variable (Stasavage, 2005).
This paper explicitly analyses such a mechanism. LeBas (2011, p.7)
in her book on party-building in Africa emphasises the role of opposi-
tional parties for inducing popular mobilization through electoral con-
tests, writing that “[s]trong party organizations are necessary to push
reluctant incumbents toward reform. … Without strong opposition,
elections in these contexts are unlikely to become competitive, and rep-
resentative links between governments and citizens will remain weak.”
Usually, incumbents will have a rough idea of the main opposition's
strength. A greater oppositional threat in a democracy could therefore
increase the necessity for incumbents to scramble for votes and provide
cost-intensive concessions to the rural population. Supporting evidence
for this argument is provided by Min (2015) who shows that
multipartism in India is associated with rural electriﬁcation increases.
Successful bids of local Bahujan Samaj Party legislators in state assembly
elections provided a mandate to further their mainly rural low-Caste
voters' demands. His electriﬁcation example illustrates Varshney's
(1998) wider explanation of India's relatively low levels of urban bias
due to strong democratic and multiparty politics from below that ad-
vanced rural empowerment.
HPol2. Greater oppositional strength should be associated with higher
rural electriﬁcation and lower rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequal-
ity in sub-Saharan Africa.
Furthermore, effective implementation institutions have been ar-
gued to be a sine qua non for electriﬁcation in developing countries
(Cook, 2011). Policy implementation has been shown to greatly beneﬁt
from incorporating local communities in tactical and operational leader-
ship (Bäck andHadenius, 2008; Isham et al., 1997). As democracies gen-
erally enhance accountability and citizen participation, institutional
implementation effectiveness is a second potential intervening variable
between democracy and electriﬁcation. Nanka-Bruce (2010) andOnyeji
et al. (2012) use cross-sectional socio-economic data to investigate rural
and overall electriﬁcation access in sub-Saharan Africa, respectively.
While neither study includes political regime type or electoral variables,
both ﬁnd institutional effectiveness to be positively and statistically sig-
niﬁcantly associated with electricity access. Similarly, Ahlborg et al.(2015) ﬁnd their indicator for institutional quality to be positively asso-
ciated with general average household electricity consumption in sub-
Saharan Africa. As the argument applies equally to rural and total elec-
triﬁcation, electriﬁcation inequality is unlikely to decrease by more
than what is due to the convergence to a common natural upper
bound (cf. Brown and Mobarak, 2009).
HPol3. More effective policy implementation institutions should in-
crease rural electriﬁcation, but have no signiﬁcant effect on electriﬁca-
tion inequality.
There are a number of further interesting political variables regarding
rural electriﬁcation in sub-Saharan Africa. A growing number of quanti-
tative studies (Fenske, 2013; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Larcom et al.,
2016; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013) suggest the importance
of pre-colonial political structures for a range of present-day economic
and institutional variables. This literature is grounded in work such as
by Herbst (2000) and Mamdani (1996) which analyses the prevalence
of traditional political institutions in rural areas in-depth. All of these
quantitative studies use data from Murdock’s (1967) “Jurisdictional Hi-
erarchy Beyond the Local Community Level” index to model pre-
colonial ethnic political centralisation and map the data onto present-
day political geography. The degree of pre-colonial centralisation has
been positively associated with recent satellite light density at night as
a proxy for economic activity (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013).
As the vast majority of the economic activities proxied in this way
occur in cities due to their considerably higher emittance of light at
night, this result primarily suggests a positive association between pre-
colonial political centralisation and urban electriﬁcation.2 Yet the
strength of the spatial results warrants the inclusion of pre-colonial po-
litical centralisation in the analysis.
Herbst (2000) argues that a fundamental problem of African state-
building has been how to extend political power over vast and sparsely
settled land, an issue he asserts pre-dates colonialism and continues to
be highly salient. He separates sub-Saharan African countries by quality
of political geography. States with difﬁcult political geographies face
greater centralisation challenges than do states with favourable geogra-
phies. This effect is controlled for in the analyses as favourable political
geographies might foster national grid extensions which beneﬁt a
centralised approach and strong implementation institutions on the
ground. Mamdani (1996) shows how British indirect rule during
colonialization institutionalised decentralised despots in the form of
traditional local ethnic authorities, exacerbating the challenges of
centralised state consolidation. Following the above argument, such
an effect should be accounted for in the analyses.
Economic drivers of rural electriﬁcation
Providing electricity is highly capital intensive. Cost-efﬁcient coal,
gas or nuclear power stations imply a high-cost construction and re-
quire continuous fuel supply. While oil-ﬁred generation is practically
absent inmost developed countries, small-scale applicability and higher
availability have offset generation efﬁciency and sustainability concerns
in many low-income countries. However, related investment costs for
extensive electriﬁcation remain high. Matching electricity demand and
supply involves covering distances of several hundred kilometres. A
high-voltage transmission grid infrastructure is required where
decentralised systems are absent, and additional end-consumer distri-
bution equipment. Consequently, Barnes and Floor (1996, 519) write
that “no country … has ever completed rural electriﬁcation without
the ﬁnancial support of its public companies and government.”
A variety of non-democratic countries have achieved broad rural
electriﬁcation. Kromm (1970) explains in detail how the Soviet Union
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shortly after its founding. It managed to increase generation capacity by
a factor of 40 between the 1930s and 1960s, electrifying signiﬁcant
portions of the population. Thailand electriﬁed most of its rural pop-
ulation between the early 1970s and early 1990s during a spell of
multiple coups and ensuing military rule, albeit some institutional
democratisation. Its middle-income and steadily improving econom-
ic situation enabled a system of cross-subsidies from large to small
customers as well as a well-planned continuous electricity genera-
tion expansion (Barnes and Floor, 1996). Van Gevelt (2014) shows
how South Korea electriﬁed the vast majority of its rural population
between 1965 and 1979 during the military rule of Park Chung-hee.
His government combined a top-down state-controlled approach of
large-scale investments and cross-subsidy schemes with local par-
ticipatory approaches to ensure effective implementation.
As such economically powered electriﬁcation has been achieved in a
variety of different political regimes, political analyses of electriﬁcation
typically include income variables to enable the assessment of political
system effects at constant levels of overall economic performance. Sev-
eral studies have found positive associations between both rural and
urban electriﬁcation and GDP per capita (Mandelli et al., 2014;
Ahlborg et al., 2015; Min, 2015). Brown and Mobarak (2009) ﬁnd no
distributive effect of different GDP per capita levels between residential
and industrial consumers. In case of low electriﬁcation rates such as in
sub-Saharan Africa, a potential catch-up effect of higher income levels
by fostering both rural and urban electriﬁcation can be expected to be
negligible in terms of affecting electriﬁcation inequality.
HEcon1. Higher GDP per capita should increase rural electriﬁcation, but
should have no signiﬁcant effect on rural versus urban electriﬁcation in-
equality in sub-Saharan Africa.
While urban electriﬁcation has been argued to have a positive GDP
per capita effect, suggesting a two-way causality, this argument is
muchmore disputed for rural electriﬁcation (Cook, 2011). Additionally,
electrifying rural areas is more capital-intense than cities due to vast
economies of scale differences, implying a much smaller business case.
Herbst (2000) points to the numerous challenges of sparsely populated
African states and explains that infrastructure investments commonly
require sufﬁcient domestic savings. As noted above, 81% of power sector
infrastructure spend in sub-Saharan Africa between 2001 and 2006
came from domestic sources (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, 2010).
Quantitative research suggests a positive relationship between domes-
tic savings and domestic investment in general in sub-Saharan Africa
(Ndikumana, 2000). Onyeji et al. (2012) show that this association
holds true for electricity access particularly and that national savings
are the dominant ﬁnancial resource for national infrastructure projects.
This is especially true for infrastructure projects with small and insecure
investment returns. The savings requirement is thus expected to be sa-
lient for rural electriﬁcation in sub-Saharan Africa and particularly sa-
lient for decreasing electriﬁcation inequality.
HEcon2. Higher domestic savings should be associated with higher rural
electriﬁcation and lower rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality in
sub-Saharan Africa.
Ofﬁcial development assistance accounts for only 6% of sub-Saharan
African infrastructure spend (Foster andBriceño-Garmendia, 2010). The
effects of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa have been passionately de-
bated with conﬂicting results (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly
et al., 2003). While the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the
1980s and 1990s saw conditional aid as a central tool for development,
recent research has been considerably more critical (e.g. Moyo, 2009;
Stein, 2008). Neoliberal SAPs are criticised for favouring the urban pop-
ulation and assuming that the rural poor would automatically gain
through trickle-down effects. Recent poverty reduction orientation of
foreign aid is marred by slow progress and a lack of structural change(Stein, 2008). Quantitative research shows nopositive effect of repeated
adjustment loans on economic growth or favourable policy change
(Easterly, 2005). Chang (2002) in his book “Kicking Away the Ladder”
argues that in the last 500 years, signiﬁcant state interventions have
been necessary for now-developed countries to catch up with more ad-
vanced economies at the time by developing their infant industries. Yet
the conditions imposed by international donor agencies through SAPs in
Africa have called for a signiﬁcant reduction of state inﬂuence. Thus,
these conditional aid programmes have been making previously suc-
cessful rural electriﬁcation programmes in developing countries such
as subsidy-oriented state-interventionist policies in Thailand or South
Korea considerably more difﬁcult.
Moreover, Knack (2001) and others have pointed out that states
obtaining substantial shares of their revenue from international donors
are less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure tomaintain
popular legitimacy. This mechanism directly opposes the effect of de-
mocracy on rural electriﬁcation argued above. Stasavage (2005) ﬁnds
a statistically and substantially signiﬁcant negative association between
aid and primary education spending in sub-Saharan Africa. He similarly
argues that aid enables governments to cultivate support through other
channels than spending on education, reducing incentives for educa-
tional spending for this purpose ceteris paribus.
HEcon3. Higher aid levels should have an adverse effect on rural electri-
ﬁcation and might increase rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality
in sub-Saharan Africa.
This paper controls for a number of additional economic variables.
Following Brown and Mobarak (2009), agriculture as percentage of
GDP as a potential driver of rural electriﬁcation is introduced in several
econometric models. A higher relative income contribution of agricul-
ture could imply additional incentives to electrify the rural population
to increase productivity while low agricultural GDP contributions may
lessen such incentives in favour of an often urbanised industry, ceteris
paribus (Kirubi et al., 2009). A primary energy resources variable cap-
tures different availabilities of raw materials for electricity production,
namely coal, oil, natural gas anduranium. If such rawmaterials are pres-
ent in a given country, electricity generation is arguably eased. As these
rawmaterials can be either used domestically or sold to generate natu-
ral resource rents, they furthermore constitute an interesting trade-off
for national electriﬁcation planners.Min (2015) includes such a variable
to control for the incentive to divert state resources towards resource
extraction and the diminishing accountability of governments towards
their population when natural resource rents are available. This indi-
cates the potential presence of two contrary effects of natural resources.
Industry as percentage of GDP is controlled for as higher values might
suggest a focus on urban over rural electriﬁcation due to the mostly
urban location of industry (see Brown and Mobarak, 2009). GDP per
capita growth is further used to control for temporal ﬂuctuations of in-
comewhich could have an effect of short-term funding availabilities for
infrastructure projects.Demographic drivers of rural electriﬁcation
In any given country, the more people live in rural areas, the more
people need access to electricity to reach the same rural electriﬁcation
rate. Thus, higher rural population percentages impede increases of
the national rural electriﬁcation rate. (Mandelli et al., 2014; Min,
2015; Nanka-Bruce, 2010; Onyeji et al., 2012). Similarly, low population
densities are a considerable barrier for expanding infrastructure in sub-
Saharan Africa. Marginal costs of penetrating large sparsely populated
areas are usually signiﬁcantly higher than in urban areas, and state-
sponsored infrastructure projects are more difﬁcult to implement
when the state apparatus is not well represented in certain areas
(Herbst, 2000). Several studies conﬁrm a positive association between
population density and electriﬁcation in developing countries
3 Lindberg's (2009) data set shows that of the 45 countries with available data, 39 are
governed by a presidential system, 5 by a parliamentary system, and 1 country has
switched between the two between 1990 and 2010.
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mographic factors can be expected to be particularly salient when rural
and urban electriﬁcation are compared.
HDemo1. A lower percentage of rural population should increase rural
electriﬁcation and decrease rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality
in sub-Saharan Africa.
HDemo2. Higher population density should increase rural electriﬁcation
and decrease rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Including both rural population share and population density in the
same econometric model may further function as a proxy to control for
Herbst's (2000) theory of favourable political geographies. His maps of
African countries discuss the degree of dispersion of the population
over the land to be governed by the state. Including both of these geo-
graphic variables enables an interpretation of the population density co-
efﬁcient while holding the rural population share constant, which
together may function as a measure of dispersion. Herbst's (2000) the-
ory thus further supportsHDemo2when amodel also includes the rural
population share as an explanatory variable.
As constructing electricity infrastructure takes several years, govern-
ment decisions of future public service allocationsmay be inﬂuenced by
urbanisation. A growing urbanpopulation shifts themedian voter closer
to urban areas, therebypotentially shifting political attention in the con-
text of contested elections. Hence, a control variable measuring urban
population growth is added to the econometric models. Furthermore,
a population variable is controlled for to account for absolute scale
effects.
Data and descriptive statistics
Dependent variables
Two different dependent variables are used in this paper. First, Rural
electriﬁcationmeasures the fraction of the rural population with access
to electricity, indicating a tangible rather than budgetary public good
provision. Second, Rural/urban electriﬁcation as a ratio of rural versus
urban electricity access describes electriﬁcation inequality. As no coun-
try in the sample has higher rural than urban electriﬁcation, this vari-
able ranges from 0% to 100% equality. The World Bank reports rural
and urban electriﬁcation rates most comprehensively (World Bank,
2015). Owed to its slow-movingnature, electriﬁcation data are available
once a decade for 1990, 2000 and 2010 for all 48 sub-Saharan African
countries. It coherently follows the above deﬁnition of electriﬁcation,
uses threemain data sources and applies an econometric modelling ap-
proach to smoothen any potentially remaining compatibility issues.
More than half of the data points are taken from standardized large-
scale surveys from the USAIDDemographic andHealth Survey Program,
each sampling 5000–10,000 households. A further third of the data
points are based on World Bank estimates backed by internal surveys
and triangulation methods. National censuses provide the remaining
data. Some surveys were not conducted in the reference year at the be-
ginning of a decade, a negligible effect given electriﬁcation's slow and
generally monotonous increase.
Some scholars have questioned the accuracy of electriﬁcation data
(e.g. Kroth et al., 2014). While infrastructure data from developing
countries should generally be handled with care, two independent
sources appear to back World Bank data. First, the International Energy
Agency (IEA) publishes rural and urban electriﬁcation rates in sub-
Saharan Africa and 22 of its countries since 2009. Data points are gath-
ered from industry, ofﬁcial government bodies and various surveys. For
2010, the IEA reports an overall electriﬁcation of 12.9%, similar to the
World Bank ﬁgure of 14.1% (International Energy Agency, 2012). A
country-by-country comparison reveals an overall deviation of 0.8 per-
centage points. Second, independent researchers and ofﬁcial governmentpublications conﬁrm several data points. Some of these accounts are used
in the Case example analyses section. Recent literature has started to
match night time satellite images with geocoded population data to
proxy village electriﬁcation (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013;
Min, 2015). While this method carries several merits, Min points out ac-
curacy issues with electriﬁcation rates from satellite images deviating by
up to 50% diversions from Indian census data. Especially in terms of rural
electriﬁcation, he discusses problems regarding limited sensitivity of sat-
ellite sensors, measurement errors in rural areas close to big cities, bias
due to measurement of non-electricity induced light sources, limited
temporal data availability and the difﬁculties to infer speciﬁc household
as opposed to merely streetlight presence. This paper therefore uses
World Bank electriﬁcation data throughout.
Independent variables
Democracy models the degree of democracy in a speciﬁc country
using the standard 21-point Polity IV scale (Marshall and Jaggers,
2014). One robustness test exchanges Polity IV for the 7-point Freedom
House Political Rights scale (Puddington, 2013). To test hypothesis
HPol2, Opposition denotes the fraction of votes the leading oppositional
party or challenger of the incumbent received in national elections. It
uses results from presidential elections in presidential, and parliamen-
tary elections in parliamentary government systems.3 Rather than di-
chotomously denoting if an election featured more than one
candidate (cf. Stasavage, 2005), Opposition indicates to what degree
the presence of electoral competition actually mattered. It quantiﬁes
the credibility of the threat for incumbents to lose power, thereby
linking democracy to the need for incumbents to provide public services
to voters. Data were taken from Lindberg (2009), updated until 2010
through National Election Agency (NEA) data where applicable. For
those models that explicitly study the intervening effect of Opposition
on Democracy, data points are missing when either no elections oc-
curred during a speciﬁc decade or the opposition was banned from par-
ticipating. However, as most sub-Saharan African countries have held
elections between 1990 and 2010, 43 countries are still included in
the analyses. Where elections have been argued to be fraudulent, this
conceptualisation implicitly assumes that the threat to lose power is
lower where governments successfully manipulated the vote such
that the opposition received lower shares. To testHPol3, Government ef-
fectivenessmeasures how effective government policies are implement-
ed. The World Bank publishes such a measure in its annual World
Governance Indicators. Its continuous scale between−2.5 and 2.5 cap-
tures perceptions of the quality of public services and explicitly focuses
on policy implementation.
In terms of the political control variables, Centralisationmodels the
degree of pre-colonial political centralisation. The variable ranges be-
tween 0 (completely decentralised) and 1 (completely centralised)
and is taken from Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). The data for Political ge-
ography is taken from Herbst (2000) and is modelled as an ordinal var-
iable with three of Herbst's categories (favourable, neutral, difﬁcult),
excluding the four “Hinterland Countries” Chad, Mali, Mauritania and
Niger. Small island states that Herbst does not include in his analysis
ﬁt his description of favourable geography best (they are small and
have the largest concentration of people in and close to the capital)
and are thus included in the favourable category. Ziltener and Künzler
(2013) provide data for a binary Indirect rule variable to denotewhether
a country was subject to indirect rule.
Further economic and demographic variables included in themodels
are available from either the World Bank's World Development Indica-
tors (World Bank, 2015) or the IEA. To avoidmulticollinearity risks with
Table 1
Summary statistics and data sources.
Variable Source Obs. Mean SD Range
Dependents
Rural
electriﬁcation
World Bank (WDI) 144 12.30 17.83 .10–.100
Rural/urban
electriﬁcation
World Bank (WDI) 144 21.61 25.84 .13–100
Politics
Democracy Polity IVa 135 −1.26 5.75 −10–10
Opposition Lindberg (2009),
NEA
90 22.43 11.07 0–47.41
Gov't
effectiveness
World Bank (WGI) 96 − .75 .62 −2.18–.72
Centralisation Gennaioli and
Rainer (2007)
126 53.73 31.85 0–100
Political
geography
Herbst (2000) 123 1.66 .85 1–3
Indirect rule Ziltener and
Künzler (2013)
120 .63 .49 0–1
Economy
GDP per capita
(2013 103$)
World Bank (WDI) 140 1.061 1.73 .117–11.44
Aid (% GNI) World Bank (WDI) 137 13.36 11.56 .31–72.80
Fuel per capita
(Gtoe)
IEA 141 .75 3.03 0–28.40
Agriculture
(% GDP)
World Bank (WDI) 134 28.61 16.15 2.70–69.36
Savings (% GDP) World Bank (WDI) 126 13.75 11.91 −26.58–61.84
GDP p.c. growth World Bank (WDI) 138 1.16 3.98 −10.31–31.94
Industry (% GDP) World Bank (WDI) 134 25.07 12.52 5.96–70.04
Demography
Rural population
(%)
World Bank (WDI) 144 64.58 15.91 14.30–94.58
Population
density
World Bank (WDI) 144 76.47 108.14 1.71–631.00
Urbanisation
(% growth)
World Bank (WDI) 144 4.34 1.91 .26–13.40
Population (log) World Bank (WDI) 144 15.49 1.58 11.16–18.89
Notes: The summary statistics above refer to the models presented in all tables except
Table 3. Please refer to Table 7 in the Appendix A for summary statistics of themodels pre-
sented in Table 3.
All variables other than the dependents have been calculated as a 10-year average for each
country between the three time periods (i.e. 1981–1990, 1991–2000 and 2001–2010).
Missing values for particular years were omitted from decade averages.
a One robustness test uses Freedom House scores instead of Polity IV scores.
Fig. 2. Rural electriﬁcation, Rural/urban electriﬁcation, Democracy, GDP per capita and Rural Po
and Rural population is 1981, reference year values are−5.05, 694 (2013 USD), and 77.4%, resp
erence year values are 7.7% and 13.5%, respectively. All variables have been normalised to 100 fo
scale from−10 to 10. An increase on the scale denotes an improvement in the level of democ
calculation. Therefore the reference value for 1981 is 0.2475, i.e. (−5.05 + 10)/20.
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absolute urban population growth. Fuel per capita is measured in an-
nual gigatons of oil equivalent (Gtoe) and comprises domestic oil,
coal, natural gas and uranium mining. Fuel per capita as well as GDP
per capita are modelled as absolute values as the overall model ﬁt
was found to be slightly better compared to log-transformations. In-
terpretation is also more straight-forward for non-transformed var-
iables. Log-transforming Population did slightly improve the model
ﬁt, in addition to decreasing the number of orders of magnitudes
present in the model, which is why this variable is transformed in
the analyses. Whether or not log-transformations were used had
no signiﬁcant effect on the main explanatory variables. Shapiro–
Wilk tests indicated that such log-transformations did not markedly
improve the normality of the variables. As dependent variable data
are available for 1990, 2000 and 2010, all independent and control
variables are calculated averages for three equally long time periods
from 1981–1990, 1991–2000 and 2001–2010. This yields an average
lag of 5 years for all independent variables, a suitable timeframe for
changes in independent variables to materialise as infrastructural
deltas. For each variable, years with missing data are omitted from
calculating decade averages. Table 1 summarises the descriptive sta-
tistics for all variables.
Fig. 2 illustrates indexed variations of key variables between 1981
and 2010. Rural electriﬁcation has almost doubled in sub-Saharan
Africa between 1990 and 2010, however starting from a low base of
7.7%. It grew slightly stronger than urban electriﬁcation, with higher
growth in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP per
capita declined in the 1980s and early 1990s amidst kick-started
Structural Adjustment Programme interventions. This development
has reversed towards the end of the decade, with a recent stronger
growth period in the 2000s. The switch to multiparty elections in al-
most all sub-Saharan African countries in the early 1990s caused de-
mocracy scores to rise rapidly. Additional yet reduced growth
occurred during the region's on-going democratisation process. The
rural population percentage constantly declined from 77.4% in
1981 to 64.8% in 2010. While they do not establish causality, these
overall patterns are broadly consistent with hypotheses HPol1,
HEcon1, and HDemo1.pulation against Time in sub-Saharan Africa a Reference year for Democracy, GDP per capita
ectively. Reference year for Rural electriﬁcation and Rural/urban electriﬁcation is 1990, ref-
r their respective reference years. b TheDemocracy variable ismodelled using the Polity IV
racy. The scale has been linearly transformed to 0–1 in the above ﬁgure to allow an index
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Modelling approach
This paper estimates a series of panel data and pooled OLS models,
ﬁrst using Rural electriﬁcation as the dependent variable, and later
switching toRural/urban electriﬁcation. Not surprisingly, the data exhibit
country-level autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, a Glejser's Test
following Machado and Silva (2000) is signiﬁcant beyond 99.9%. All
models therefore estimate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent standard errors.
Models (1)–(5) present the main ﬁxed-effects panel data models
with country-clustered standard errors, utilising 135 observations
from 46 sub-Saharan African countries. The country-decade data format
renders the panel noticeably short. Model (1) analyses the main hy-
potheses, including Democracy, GDP per capita and Rural population as
explanatory variables. Models (2)–(5) successively add several eco-
nomic (Aid, Fuel per capita and Agriculture) as well as demographic
(Population density, Urbanisation and Population) explanatory and con-
trol variables to demonstrate rigidity. A Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF)
test reveals that Population density and Population are highly
multicollinear with the country ﬁxed-effects.4 Both sub-Saharan
African population, and with it, population densities, have slowly and
monotonously increased by at most a factor of 2 over the last 30 years,
yet lie within a range of several orders of magnitude across countries.
Therefore, they map relatively distinctively onto the country ﬁxed-
effects, causing the high degree of multicollinearity. Models
(1)–(4) thus omit Population density and Population to allow direct in-
ference of all variables, while model (5) analyses the robustness of the
results in the presence of these two variables. In order to maximize
the number of usable observations, the intervening political variables
Opposition and Government effectiveness, as well as Savings are only in-
cluded in later models. In addition to the ﬁxed-effects, decade dummy
variables for unobserved temporal effects were tested. While the De-
mocracy variable remained statistically signiﬁcant, the temporal
dummy variables were neither independently nor jointly signiﬁcant
andwere thus excluded.5 This result is not surprising as the dependents
havemonotonically increased (i.e. stayed constant or strictly increased)
for any 10-year time period in the sample, thus deemingmarginal tem-
poral effects close to constant and non-deterministic.
Asmodels (1)–(5) includeﬁxed-effects to allowwithin-country var-
iation analyses, they account for all time-invariant country-level effects
by deﬁnition. This also includes the pre-colonial and colonial political
variables Centralisation, Political geography and Indirect Rule as they are
constant between the scope of the study, i.e. sub-Saharan Africa's
democratisation process between 1990 and 2010. In order to explicitly
estimate the association between rural electriﬁcation and the pre-
colonial and colonial political institutions, model (6) uses a Hausman–
Taylor estimator with country clustered standard errors (Hausman
and Taylor, 1981). Thismethod employs a randomeffect transformation
while using time-variant variables exogenous to the ﬁxed effects as
instrumental variables to remove the correlation of endogenous time-
variant and time-invariant variables with the ﬁxed effects. A Sargan–
Hansen test conﬁrms the validity of using Rural Population and
Democracy as time-variant instrument variables to help to consistently
estimate Centralisation, Political geography and Indirect rule.
To strengthen the results of the econometric analysis, the panel
data models (7)–(12) repeat models (1)–(6) assuming piecewise
interpolability of the dependent variable, thereby increasing the amount4 In the presence of country dummy variables, the VIFs for both variables are above 50.
Hair et al. (2010) suggest that VIFs above 10 indicate severe multicollinearity risks.
5 Stasavage (2005) ﬁnds the same insigniﬁcance of year effects in his models on public
serviceprovision in sub-SaharanAfrica during a similar time frameand also excludes them
from all his models.of usable observations to 468. As is common for infrastructure capacity
with several decade-long lifespans in developing countries (see for in-
stance Herbst (2000) with respect to road networks), rural electriﬁca-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa has monotonically increased for any country
in any 10-year period with available data as mentioned above. Large
spikes in short timeframes are generally absent in such data as
expanding the national grid infrastructure in vast territories is a gradual
process. This supports the assumption that the dependent can be piece-
wise interpolated between two dates that are reasonably close to each
other. For above reasons, the World Bank similarly makes such an as-
sumption in its rural electriﬁcation data (World Bank, 2015). If piecewise
interpolating in 2-year steps, four sets of observations each can be added
between 1990 and 2000, and between 2000 and 2010 based on existing
data. All independent and control variables are then calculated as a 2-
year average preceding the Rural electriﬁcation observation, thereby
shortening but maintaining their lag. The summary statistics for these
models are available in Appendix A. Different methods of interpolation,
i.e. piecewise linear, exponential and polynomial, as well as different
lengths of interpolated time periodswere tested. They have had no note-
worthy effect on statistical signiﬁcance levels in any model. Models
(7)–(12) employ piecewise linear interpolation, robustness tests (25)
and (26) change to a 3-year step interpolation and compare linear to ex-
ponential interpolation of the form y = axb.
Models (13a)–(15b) and (16a)–(18b) use Rural electriﬁcation and
Rural/urban electriﬁcation as dependent variables, respectively. They
subsequently introduce the two intervening institutional political vari-
ables Opposition and Government effectiveness to compare models with
these intervening variables to base models that use the same observa-
tion set but includeDemocracy as sole political variable. A decreasedDe-
mocracy coefﬁcient coupled with respective statistical signiﬁcance
levels would suggest that parts of the Democracy association with the
dependents may be explained by Opposition and Government effective-
ness. Data availability is comparably scarce, the number of usable obser-
vations drops to 66 from 41 sub-Saharan African countries when all
relevant variables are included. Models (15a) and (15b), as well as
(18a) and (18b) re-run the previous models and exclude all insigniﬁ-
cant variables. As several countries contribute only one observation, es-
timating country dummy ﬁxed effects is not feasible, in addition to
likely biasing standard errors due to high numbers of estimated
coefﬁcients.6 Models (13a)–(18b) cluster standard errors by countries
to account for country-level dependencies, Population density and Popu-
lation are now included in the models. Robustness test (22) repeats
model (4) to test the effect of running a pooled OLS model instead of
ﬁxed-effects and adding Population density and Population.
The robustness test section furthermore examines different model-
ling and error term assumptions.Model (19) uses a Prais–WinstenGen-
eralized Least Squares (GLS) regression. This method adjusts for serial
correlation without losing the ﬁrst observation in order to fully utilize
the short panel data. Model (20) deploys the Generalized Estimating
Equation (GEE) approach, which in contrast to models (1)–(3) is
based on quasilikelihood theory that assumes no particular response
observations distribution. A random-effects formulation, although of
secondary interest given the focus on within-country changes in this
study, is provided inmodel (21). The robustness test section further ad-
dresses potential issues of multicollinearity, endogeneity, measurement
errors, data source dependence, cross-sectional correlation as well as
different interpolation assumptions to support the resilience of the re-
sults. While quantitative research on electriﬁcation in sub-Saharan
Africa with small sample sizes has produced valuable insights before6 Estimates of error terms robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation commonly
need at least twice as many observations as variables (Varmuza and Filzmoser, 2009).
High observation-to-variable ratios are generally preferable, with recommended mini-
mum ratios starting around 2:1 and often higher (Arrindell and Van der Ende, 1985).
Table 2
Panel data models (dependent variable: rural electriﬁcation).
Model (1)a (2)a (3)a (4)a (5)a,b (6)c
Politics
Democracy .277***
(2.96)
.274***
(2.83)
.325***
(3.12)
.306***
(2.90)
.266**
(2.15)
.317***
(2.77)
Centralisation .0607
(1.44)
Political geography 1.682
–favourabled (.55)
–neutrald 4.891
(1.22)
Indirect rule − .0686
(− .03)
Economy
GDP per capita (103$) .882*
(1.80)
.708*
(1.67)
2.326**
(2.42)
1.902*
(1.96)
1.810*
(1.75)
.511***
(3.30)
Aid (% GNI) − .0347
(− .84)
− .0453
(−1.10)
− .0367
(− .90)
− .0431
(− .95)
Fuel per capita (Gtoe) .00365
(.01)
− .0204
(− .08)
− .0243
(− .10)
Agriculture (% GDP) − .0280
(− .39)
− .0341
(− .50)
− .0279
(− .41)
Demography
Rural population (%) − .536***
(−4.77)
− .495***
(−4.73)
− .344***
(−2.96)
− .329***
(−3.09)
− .303*
(−1.99)
− .386***
(−4.54)
Population density .00810
(.50)
Urbanisation (%) − .398
(−1.36)
− .379
(−1.29)
Population (log) 1.054
(.31)
N 135 133 125 125 125 115
R2 .489 .492 .506 .518 .520 .539
Number of countries 46 46 44 44 44 39
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include unreported
constants.
a Models (1) – (5) are ﬁxed-effectsmodels with country-clustered standard errors to explorewithin-country variation. As the pre-colonial and colonial political variables Centralisation,
Political geography and Indirect Rule are time-invariant for the examined time period, like all other constant country effects they are accounted for in the ﬁxed-effects models.
b Population density and Population are highly multicollinear with country ﬁxed effects. Model (4) is only included to demonstrate robustness with further demographic controls. It
should not be used for inference for Population density and Population.
c To consistently estimate time-invariant variables in the panel data, model (6) uses an Hausman–Taylor estimator with country-clustered standard errors. Rural population and De-
mocracy function as instrumental variables, a Sargan–Hansen test clearly conﬁrms the validity of the related exogeneity assumptions.
d Political geography is an ordinal variable with “difﬁcult political geographies” (Herbst, 2000) as reference category.
7 In fact, Djiboutimanaged to increase its rural electriﬁcation from5.5% in 2000 to 10.2%
in 2010 while its average Polity IV score increased by 8 points.
8 The comparably lower statistical signiﬁcance levels could be expected as most of their
results are based on the few, predominantly urban areas that appear lit in their data.
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tions raise the risk of producing erroneous econometric results. There-
fore, in addition to the various strategies in the econometric
modelling to circumvent this problem discussed above, this paper
complements the econometric analyses with in-depth qualitative ro-
bustness tests. It presents evidence from ﬁve country case-examples,
three of which are presented in the main text, two further ones in
Appendices B–C. These case studies further support the paper's overall
arguments.
Econometric model results
Estimates for rural electriﬁcation
Table 2 presents the main panel data model results (1)–(6), Table
3 re-runs these models under the interpolability assumption
(7)–(12). The statistical signiﬁcance levels do not change markedly
between the two approaches, if anything they become slightly stron-
ger in models (7)–(12) as a greater portion of variability can be
absorbed by the explanatory variables. All explanatory variable
coefﬁcients have the expected sign, Democracy, GDP per capita and
Rural population are the only statistically signiﬁcant variables
throughout models (1)–(12).
Democracy is strongly positively associated with rural electriﬁcation
in sub-Saharan Africa. It is its strongest predictor together with rural
population percentages. This result supports the ﬁrst half of HPol1.
Holding all other variables constant, a one standard-deviation of theDemocracy variable, i.e. 5.75 points or roughly a 25 percentage points
jump on the−10–10 Polity IV scale, would increase rural electriﬁcation
of a country at median electriﬁcation level by 31%, despite the
constraining presence of an upper and a lower bound on theDemocracy
value. The median country-year rural electriﬁcation in the data is
Djibouti in 2000 with 5.5% rural electriﬁcation, thus such a Democracy
score increase in the country is associated with an increase to 7.2%
rural electriﬁcation, ceteris paribus.7 The result is statistically and sub-
stantially robust to the inclusion of different political, economic and de-
mographic control variables as well as when interpolability of the
dependent is assumed. The Centralisation variable coefﬁcient, denoting
the degree of pre-colonial political centralisation, is positive in both
models (6) and (12), and slightly statistically signiﬁcant in the latter.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the results presented by Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2013).8 The other two political control variables
have the expected sign, yet are not found to be statistically signiﬁcant.
GDP per capita, a measure often used to proxy infrastructural
development, is similarly positively associated with higher rural
electriﬁcation, supporting the ﬁrst part of HEcon1. It exhibits slightly
Table 3
Panel data models assuming piecewise interpolability of the dependent (dependent variable: rural electriﬁcation).
Model (7)a (8)a (9)a (10)a (11)a,b (12)c
Politics
Democracy .142***
(4.23)
.127***
(3.99)
.142***
(3.83)
.138***
(3.77)
.0813**
(2.53)
.162**
(2.17)
Centralisation .0809*
(1.88)
Political geography 1.667
–favourabled (.53)
–neutrald 4.220
(1.12)
Indirect rule .328
(.12)
Economy
GDP per capita (103$) .541***
(6.16)
.521***
(6.07)
1.725***
(7.04)
1.665***
(7.85)
1.535***
(8.61)
.350***
(3.81)
Aid (% GNI) − .00361
(− .53)
− .00829
(−1.59)
− .00513
(− .75)
− .00316
(− .39)
Fuel per capita (Gtoe) .318**
(3.02)
.325**
(3.17)
.237**
(2.52)
Agriculture (% GDP) − .0131
(−1.19)
− .00388
(− .27)
.00593
(.42)
Demography
Rural population (%) − .601***
(−17.89)
− .583***
(−15.66)
− .476***
(−8.91)
− .464***
(−8.75)
− .337***
(−12.48)
− .470***
(−4.92)
Population density .00217
(.45)
Urbanisation (%) − .252***
(−3.74)
− .249***
(−1.29)
Population (log) 4.292***
(5.20)
N 468 463 439 439 439 399
R2 .454 .454 .478 .487 .503 .465
Number of countries 46 46 44 44 44 39
The above models assume that the dependent variable, Rural electriﬁcation, can be interpolated in 2-year steps based on observations from 1990, 2000 and 2010. This assumption stems
from themonotonically increasing nature of rural electriﬁcation and the predominate absence of large spikes in short timeframes common to such infrastructure measures. This assump-
tion is also used by the World Bank. All independent and control variables are now calculated as a 2-year average preceding the Rural electriﬁcation observation, thereby shortening but
maintaining their lag. Different methods of interpolation have had no noteworthy effect on statistical signiﬁcance levels in any model (see robustness tests). The above models employ
piecewise linear interpolation, adding four sets of observations between 1990 and 2000, and between 2000 and 2010, respectively. Please refer to Table 7 in Appendix A for summary
statistics.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include unreported
constants.
a Models (7)–(11) are ﬁxed-effects models to explorewithin-country variation. As the pre-colonial and colonial political variables Centralisation, Political geography and Indirect Rule are
time-invariant for the examined time period, like all other constant country effects they are accounted for in the ﬁxed-effects models.
b Population density and Population are highlymulticollinear with the countryﬁxed effects.Model (11) is only included to demonstrate robustnesswith further demographic controls. It
should not be used for inference for Population density and Population.
c To consistently estimate time-invariant variables in the panel data, model (12) uses an Hausman–Taylor estimator with country-clustered standard errors. Rural population and De-
mocracy function as instrumental variables, a Sargan–Hansen test clearly conﬁrms the validity of the related exogeneity assumptions.
d Political geography is an ordinal variable with “difﬁcult political geographies” (Herbst, 2000) as reference category.
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ation GDP per capita change would increase the median rural electri-
ﬁcation by 53%. Djibouti in 2000 is thus estimated to increase its rural
electriﬁcation from 5.5% to 7.8% if the per capita GDP were $1730
higher. The other economic independent and control variables
examined in the panel data models are not consistently statistically
signiﬁcant.
SupportingHDemo1, Rural population is strongly negatively associat-
ed with rural electriﬁcation, suggesting its relative impeding effect for
reaching a given rural electriﬁcation level. While models (5) and (11)
should not be used for inference for the Population density variable
due to the severe multicollinearity with the country ﬁxed-effects
discussed in the Modelling approach section, the models do ﬁnd weak
evidence that Urbanisation is associated with lower rural electriﬁcation.
Only models (10) and (11) attribute statistical signiﬁcance to the
coefﬁcient.
Table 4 shows models (13a)–(15b) to analyse the two intervening
variables of oppositional strength and government effectiveness as
well as additional economic controls. Model (13a) introduces Oppo-
sition, model (14a) adds Government effectiveness. Both variables de-
crease the number of usable observations considerably. Once thesparse intervening political variables are included, Savings does not
greatly affect the number of usable observations. All explanatory
variables have the expected sign. Democracy, GDP per capita and
Rural electriﬁcation are again statistically signiﬁcant throughout. As
the available data points in models (13a)–(15b) are strongly clus-
tered in the most recent 2001–2010 time period where rural electri-
ﬁcation has generally been higher than in the 1980s and 1990s, the
absolute value of all three coefﬁcients increases compared to the earlier
panel data models.
The signiﬁcance of Democracy is stronger in the base models (13b),
(14b) and (15b) compared to when the intervening variables are
added tomodels (13a), (14a) and (15a), however the variable stays sig-
niﬁcant throughout evenwhen both intervening variables are included.
Opposition and Government effectiveness are both statistically signiﬁcant
in these models, the latter slightly stronger than the former. Democracy
is the only signiﬁcant variable where their introduction markedly af-
fects the coefﬁcient. TheOpposition variable alone lowers theDemocracy
coefﬁcient by 16.7%, when Opposition and Government effectiveness are
added it decreases by 22.4%, suggesting that both oppositional strength
and effective implementation institutions may explains parts of
democracy's positive association with rural electriﬁcation. This effect
Table 4
Pooled-OLS analyses of intervening and additional economic control variables (dependent variable: rural electriﬁcation).
Model (13a) (13b) (14a) (14b) (15a) (15b)
Politics
Democracy .665*
(1.80)
.798**
(2.10)
.653**
(2.63)
.842***
(2.97)
.810***
(3.18)
1.134***
(4.53)
Opposition .242**
(2.09)
.149*
(1.74)
.195*
(1.89)
Gov’t effectiveness 5.726**
(2.22)
4.755**
(2.48)
Economy
GDP per capita (103$) 5.361**
(2.12)
5.337**
(2.17)
4.362**
(2.09)
5.731***
(2.73)
2.401**
(2.69)
2.247**
(2.05)
Aid (% GNI) − .358**
(−2.03)
− .336*
(−1.85)
− .237
(−1.60)
− .238
(−1.47)
− .291**
(−2.40)
− .238***
(−2.91)
Fuel per capita (Gtoe) −1.602**
(−2.59)
−1.679**
(−2.40)
− .723
(−1.19)
−1.176
(−1.66)
Agriculture (% GDP) .0991
(.75)
.126
(.85)
.198
(1.42)
.103
(.69)
Savings (% GDP) .218*
(1.69)
.170
(1.38)
.163
(1.22)
.199
(1.59)
GDP per capita growth − .130
(− .19)
− .339
(− .47)
− .435
(− .93)
− .649
(−1.22)
Industry (% GDP) .0932
(.66)
.124
(.76)
.153
(1.30)
.0887
(.67)
Demography
Rural population (%) − .424***
(−3.14)
− .450***
(−3.15)
− .371***
(−3.71)
− .365***
(−3.21)
− .428***
(−4.75)
− .463***
(−4.38)
Population density .0944***
(4.63)
.0973***
(4.56)
.0826***
(6.10)
.0841***
(5.60)
.0876***
(5.12)
.0903***
(4.87)
Urbanisation (%) − .0312
(− .02)
− .229
(− .15)
−3.067**
(−2.20)
−2.773*
(−1.94)
Population (log) .353
(.22)
.764
(.52)
2.269**
(2.11)
2.972**
(2.66)
N 73 73 66 66 78 78
R2 .837 .826 .881 .863 .814 .786
Number of countries 41 41 40 40 43 43
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include unreported
constants.
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models are re-run with and without the two intervening variables. In
model (15a), the presence of Opposition and Government effectiveness
lower the Democracy coefﬁcient by 28.6%. These results support the
ﬁrst parts of HPol2 and HPol3, and furthermore suggest that due to the
continued signiﬁcance of Democracy there are additional, unobserved
intervening mechanisms that positively associate democracy with
rural electriﬁcation.
In terms of economic variables, models (13a) and (13b) ﬁnd that
apart from unchanged GDP per capita results, Aid and Fuel per capita
are statistically signiﬁcantly andnegatively associatedwith rural electri-
ﬁcation. This conﬁrms the negative signs for the Aid variable coefﬁcient
present inmodels (2)–(5) and (8)–(11). The strength of this association
decreases inmodels (14a) and (14b)where the number of observations
is further reduced, however is salient again in models (15a) and (15b).
Together, this provides positive, yet somewhat weak evidence for the
ﬁrst half ofHEcon3. The similarity of Dutch disease effects of aid and nat-
ural resources on sub-Saharan African economies ﬁnds resemblance in
their respective negative association with rural electriﬁcation. All
other things being equal, the presence of such rents, which are subject
to limited public scrutiny, enable governments to attract support differ-
ently than by making rural infrastructure concessions, thereby decreas-
ing incentives to do so. As explained above, the conditionality of aid
might additionally hinder successful electriﬁcation policies that have
worked in other regions.
Both demographic independent variables Rural population and Pop-
ulation density are highly statistically and substantially signiﬁcant, con-
stituting further evidence for the ﬁrst parts of HDemo1 and HDemo2.
Doubling the population density from its mean of 76 people per square
kilometre to 152 more than doubles the median country's ruralelectriﬁcation, ceteris paribus. In this sample, the median country-year
is Madagascar in 2000 with 6.6% rural electriﬁcation. Increasing its
population density by 76 people per square kilometre is associated with
a rural electriﬁcation rate of 13.4% instead of 6.6%. Urbanisation again is
weakly negatively associated with rural electriﬁcation, while marginal
scale effects of larger populations are also conﬁrmed. As the data set
becomes more skewed towards the most recent 2001–2010 period,
overall and urban scale effects are more salient due to their exponential
nature.
Estimates for rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality
Models (16a)–(18b) in Table 5 use Rural/urban electriﬁcation as their
dependent variable. Values closer to 100% indicate higher equality of
electriﬁcation. The models use the same political, economic and demo-
graphic independent and control variables as above.
The Democracy variable is highly statistically and substantially sig-
niﬁcant in all models, again its statistical signiﬁcance level decreases
only slightly when the intervening variables are added. A one-
standard Democracy deviation is estimated to increase the rural versus
urban electriﬁcation ratio of the median country by 70%. In the sample,
Benin in 2000 has themedium rural versus urban electriﬁcation ratio of
11%. Thus, a jump of 5.75 on the Polity IV Democracy scale is associated
with a rural versus urban electriﬁcation rate of 18.7%. Similarly to
models (13a)–(15b), its coefﬁcient decreases when the intervening po-
litical variables are introduced. The addition of the Opposition again af-
fects the Democracy coefﬁcient most of all signiﬁcant variables,
decreasing it by 14.1%. There is little additional effect of introducing
Government effectiveness, the Democracy coefﬁcient is 16.9% smaller in
(16a) compared to its base model (16b). While the Opposition variable
is strongly signiﬁcant in statistic and substantive terms, Government
Table 5
Pooled OLS analyses of electriﬁcation inequality (dependent variable: rural versus urban electriﬁcation).
Model (16a) (16b) (17a) (17b) (18a) (18b)
Politics
Democracy 1.155**
(2.54)
1.344***
(2.83)
1.213***
(3.22)
1.461***
(3.51)
1.395***
(2.88)
1.508***
(3.14)
Opposition .343***
(2.80)
.234***
(2.70)
.299**
(2.40)
Gov’t effectiveness 6.382
(1.55)
Economy
GDP per capita (103$) 6.473
(1.66)
6.439
(1.66)
4.671
(1.27)
6.194
(1.66)
Aid (% GNI) − .458**
(−2.52)
− .427**
(−2.19)
− .334**
(−2.05)
− .328*
(−1.80)
− .658***
(−3.04)
− .637***
(−2.98)
Fuel per capita (Gtoe) −3.470**
(−2.02)
−3.580*
(−1.94)
−2.230
(−1.28)
−2.748
(−1.41)
Agriculture (% GDP) .158
(.93)
.196
(1.03)
.251
(1.44)
.152
(0.81)
Savings (% GDP) .560***
(2.98)
.493**
(2.60)
.526***
(2.83)
.553***
(2.87)
.824**
(2.26)
.725**
(2.03)
GDP per capita growth − .512
(− .59)
− .810
(− .89)
− .821
(−1.23)
−1.124
(−1.57)
Industry (% GDP) .344
(1.47)
.388
(1.55)
.415*
(1.86)
.351
(1.51)
Demography
Rural population (%) − .498***
(−3.01)
− .536***
(−2.96)
− .425***
(−3.38)
− .425***
(−3.12)
− .504***
(−3.69)
− .524***
(−3.71)
Population density .0773***
(3.86)
.0814***
(3.70)
.0670***
(4.04)
.0693***
(3.91)
.0848***
(4.54)
.0868***
(4.46)
Urbanisation (%) 2.021
(1.28)
1.740
(1.05)
−2.068
(−1.21)
−1.846
(−1.04)
Population (log) −1.326
(− .62)
− .741
(− .36)
1.076
(.67)
2.007
(1.22)
N 73 73 66 66 73 73
R2 .792 .777 .829 .807 .727 .714
Number of countries 41 41 40 40 41 41
Country-clustered heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models in-
clude unreported constants.
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compared to the Rural electriﬁcationmodels. This supports that strong
oppositions in democracies could pressure governments to shift their
public service focus toward the rural majority electorate, while imple-
mentation effectiveness could inﬂuence both rural and urban service
provision positively with limited effects on inequality. These ﬁndings
are consistent with the second parts of HPol1–HPol3, and similarly to
the results from models (13a)–(15b) suggest that additional unob-
served intervening mechanisms between democracy and decreased
electriﬁcation inequality exist.
Concurring with HEcon1, GDP per capita is no longer statistically sig-
niﬁcantly associated with rural electriﬁcation when the dependent
changes to Rural/urban electriﬁcation, suggesting that high income levels
may favour both rural and urban electriﬁcation rather than rural areas
speciﬁcally. Two other economic variables are statistically signiﬁcant
throughout models (16a)–(18b). First, Savings is strongly associated
with lower electriﬁcation inequality, providing evidence for the second
part ofHEcon2. A one-standard deviation increase in national savings as
a GDP percentage is associated with increasing the rural versus urban
electriﬁcation ratio of the median level country-year, Benin in 2000,
from 11% to 18.3%. As 81% of funding for the power infrastructure in
sub-Saharan Africa comes from domestic governments (Foster and
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010), higher savings can be expected to beneﬁt
rural versus urban electriﬁcation as they make rural electriﬁcation
more feasible, ceteris paribus. Second, in contrast to national savings,
Aid again is negatively associated with the dependent, as hypothesised
in HEcon3, at slightly higher signiﬁcance levels compared to the rural
electriﬁcation models. As argued in the Economic drivers of rural
electriﬁcation section, direct aid payments in the form of ofﬁcial develop-
ment assistance, while only constituting 6% of the ﬁnancial resources forthe power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa, have imposed heavy
and at times counterproductive policy conditions on sub-Saharan
African countries. Liberalisation as a guiding principle closes down
options known to have helped countries like Thailand or South Korea to
successfully electrify their rural citizens. Additionally, aid payments may
relatively decrease government requirements to win elections through
physical rural infrastructure provision with limited economic return.
Rural population and Population density are highly statistically signif-
icant, supporting the latter parts of HDemo1 and HDemo2, respectively.
Their signiﬁcance indicates the importance of demographic disadvan-
tages and barriers of rural residents for development. Control variables
Urbanisation and Population are insigniﬁcant in all models.
Model robustness
There are multiple robustness concerns of the presented results that
deserve attention. This section subsequently addresses potential issues
regarding multicollinearity, cross-sectional dependence, endogeneity,
adequacy of model choice, data source dependence, and the presence
of short panel data.
All econometric models have been tested for variable
multicollinearity. After accounting for the multicollinearity issue be-
tween country ﬁxed-effects and both Population density and Population,
the maximum VIF in any model was 5.5, all others were below 4, the av-
erage is 2.0. All of these values are considerably below the common criti-
cal value of 10 which would indicate multicollinearity risks. The
individual VIFs for the three political variables in all models are below 3.
The degree of cross-sectional dependence was analysed using a
Pesaran test to ensure independence of observations between countries.
It was found to be highly insigniﬁcant for the panel data models in
Table 6
Additional robustness tests (dependent variable: rural electriﬁcation).
Model GLS
(19)a
GEE
(20)a
RE
(21)b
OLS
(22)
OLS—FH
(23)c
FE—lin.
(24)b
FE—exp.
(25)d
Politics
Democracy .325***
(4.78)
.320***
(2.97)
.406***
(3.46)
.412**
(2.03)
−2.970***
(−2.88)
.169***
(3.85)
.162***
(3.80)
Economy
GDP per capita 1.611*** 1.694** 3.390*** 7.476*** .468 1.630*** 1.319***
(103$) (2.93)
−.0366
(2.03)
−.0365
(3.30)
−.0561
(4.11)
−.145
(.20)
−.181
(10.87)
−.00590
(9.13)
−.000641
Aid (% GNI) (−1.21)
−.0609
(− .86)
−.0516
(−1.43)
−.111
(−1.26)
−1.797***
(−1.35)
.476
(− .68)
.212
(− .06)
.308**
Fuel per capita (− .21) (− .20) (− .31) (−2.95) (.51) (1.43) (3.16)
Agriculture (% GDP) − .0430
(− .92)
− .0406
(− .57)
− .0731
(−1.22)
− .0114
(− .15)
− .0927
(− .97)
.00111
(.06)
− .00103
(− .07)
Demography
Rural population (%) − .315***
(−4.68)
− .319***
(−3.07)
− .203**
(−2.30)
− .300**
(−2.63)
− .379***
(−3.16)
− .438***
(−7.27)
− .393***
(−10.12)
Population density .00807***
(3.52)
.0927***
(3.40)
Urbanisation (%) − .461**
(−2.43)
− .443
(−1.47)
− .311
(− .84)
− .413
(− .49)
− .577
(− .63)
− .306***
(−4.39)
− .320***
(−3.91)
Population (log) 1.054
(.15)
1.097
(.97)
N 125 123 125 125 129 285 285
R2 .983 .744 .780 .697 .486 .482
Number of countries 44 41 44 44 46 44 44
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent z-/t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include unreported
constants.
a Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent AR1 error term structure. Models include unreported country ﬁxed effects.
b Random effects model.
c Democracy variable modelled using Freedom House data (lower scores indicate more democratic political system).
d Exponential interpolation of the dependent variable based on the data from 1990, 2000 and 2010.
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Table 3. To ensure that the estimation is consistent even when cross-
sectional correlation should be present, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
were used for the interpolated models which in addition to being
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation consistent also are cross-
sectional correlation consistent (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). The general
insigniﬁcance of the Pesaran test conﬁrms the presumption that rural
electriﬁcation variations in the last 20 years are mainly driven by
country-internal rather than external factors. Regional dependencies
appear to be small. The dependent variable varies considerably between
many neighbouring countries across sub-Saharan Africa. This also sup-
ports the idea that country-speciﬁc policies have considerable impact
on electriﬁcation.
Furthermore, both a statistical and a substantive argument render
the risk of endogeneity small in this study. First, all independent vari-
ables have been lagged by an average of 5 years to represent past decade
averages. For the interpolated models, while the lag reduces, it still is
positive. Unbounded variables that are modelled by past data are im-
probable to be caused by future occurrences. Second, rural electriﬁca-
tion and electriﬁcation inequality arguably have limited impact on
past assessments of the degree of democracy in a country, strengths of
the opposition,9 and continuous demographic developments. While
rural electriﬁcation may introduce new opportunities of income gener-
ation, its measureable GDP contribution has been argued to be minor
(Cook, 2011).
Robustness tests (19), (20) and (21) in Table 6 re-estimate panel
datamodel (4) using differentmodelling approaches. The results are ro-
bust to a ﬁxed-effects GLS approach as well as to a ﬁxed-effects GEE9 If there were any such association, it would likely be negative as voters choose oppo-
sitional parties because they anticipate that they will not be electriﬁed in the future under
the current government.approach. A random-effects formulation similarly does not affect the re-
sults markedly. The OLS-basedmodels (13a)–(18b) have omitted coun-
try dummy variables. Robustness test (22) investigates the adequacy of
choosing pooled OLS models for the analysis. It omits ﬁxed-effects,
allowing for the inclusion of Population density and Population, and esti-
mates country-clustered standard errors. All statistically signiﬁcant var-
iables from the panel data models remain signiﬁcant in model (22).
Remarkably, its R2 does not greatly decrease when 43 country dummy
variables are excluded, remaining at 78% without dummy variables.
The high R2-value is thus achieved by modelling 125 observations
with 9 instead of 52 variables. This indicates the relevance of the cho-
sen political, economic and demographic variables for explaining the
variations of rural electriﬁcation in sub-Saharan African countries.
Consistent with HDemo2, Population density becomes highly signiﬁ-
cant in this and all other OLS speciﬁcations. Furthermore, several
coefﬁcients increase in model (22) compared to the panel data
models. Brown andMobarak (2009) ﬁnd a similar effect in their elec-
tricity distribution study between FE and OLS models. This suggests
that unobserved country effects account for some part of rural
electriﬁcation.
To ensure that the positive association of democracy on rural electri-
ﬁcation is not subject to measurement errors, model (23) changes the
Democracy variable data source from Polity IV to FreedomHouse's Polit-
ical Rights score. It uses the same data set as model (22) to maximize
observations and ease comparability.Democracy remains highly statisti-
cally and substantially signiﬁcant. Its negative coefﬁcient is due to de-
mocracies receiving lower scores on the Freedom House scale.
Notably, GDP per capita loses its signiﬁcance and decreases in value in
this speciﬁcation. One possible explanation for this effect is that GDP
per capita is stronger correlated to Freedom House than Polity IV scores
in the data set, indicating that higher GDP per capita appear to induce
lower Freedom House scores. A one standard deviation decrease on
the Freedom House scale increases rural electriﬁcation by almost 5 per-
centage points.
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polating Rural electriﬁcation in 3-year rather than 2-year steps. Model
(24) employs piecewise linear interpolation,model (25) uses piecewise
exponential interpolation instead. The signiﬁcance of the main explan-
atory variables remains intact.
The longitudinal data used in this paper are not balanced and is con-
siderably short. To examine the severity of using short panel data, a fur-
ther unreported model was run using only observations from the most
recent time period from 2001 to 2010. Such a purely cross-sectional
speciﬁcation avoids the dangers of serial correlation in short panel
data models at the expense of a further decrease in observations.
While the resulting sample size of 43 is prone to estimation errors, the
results are consistent with the main ﬁndings.
Case example analyses
This section provides qualitative evidence from three sub-Saharan
African countries to reinforce the plausibility of the econometric results.
To examine some of the most salient cross-country variations, rural
electriﬁcation success in Ghana, high electriﬁcation inequality in
Swaziland and almost absent rural electriﬁcation in Uganda are
analysed in turn. Two further case studies, namely Senegal's recent
rural electriﬁcation success and Rwanda's low rural electriﬁcation and
high electriﬁcation inequality, are analysed in Appendices B–C for fur-
ther reference. They similarly support the econometric analyses.
Ghana
An increase from 6% rural electriﬁcation in 1990 to almost 50% in
2014 renders Ghana a notable rural electriﬁcation success story in
sub-Saharan Africa. As urban electriﬁcation increased from 75% to 85%,
electriﬁcation inequality was reversed from one of the most severe to
one of the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa.
Political factors
The democratisation process in Ghana in the 1990s and 2000s has
been highly salient in and beneﬁcial to the country's approach to rural
electriﬁcation. Jerry John Rawlings had been ruling Ghana since a mili-
tary coup in 1981, and ran for president for his National Democratic
Congress (NDC) party in the country's ﬁrst multiparty elections in
1992. Starting in the late 1980s, he positioned himself to receive wide-
spread support from Ghana's mainly rural electorate. Rural infrastruc-
ture endowments were a key strategy. Sandbrook (2000, p.105)
writes that “Rawlings had targeted the rural areas as a major base of
government support since 1988. He campaigned exclusively in the
countryside in 1992 and dispensed patronage to local communities in
the form of electricity extensions.” The National Electriﬁcation Scheme
(NES) was launched in 1989, ambitiously aiming to provide universal
electriﬁcation by 2020. This policy entailed a rural area focus entitled
Self-Help Electriﬁcation Project (SHEP), where priority was given to
communities with a population of 500 or more to maximise its reach
(Bhattacharyya, 2013). Ghanaians have been argued to exhibit a rela-
tivelymature democratic voting behaviour in their ﬁrst multiparty elec-
tions. Swing voters have been consciously evaluating government
performance (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). The NDC won the 1992
election in mainly free and fair elections, although some irregularities
were recorded. Ensuring widespread publicity, rawlings intensiﬁed
the NES ahead of the ﬁercely contested 1996 election, launching Phase
2 of SHEP in 1995. Thepolicy integrated community leadership in its im-
plementation and had a noticeable short-term goal of bringing electric-
ity immediately to one thousand towns and villages (Sandbrook, 2000).
Rural electriﬁcation skyrocketed bymore than 350% in the 1990s to 21%.
Briggs (2012) shows that constituencies targeted by the NES in the
1990s were signiﬁcantly more likely to vote for the NDC than others.
In turn, between 1992 and 1996 the NDC speciﬁcally targeted constitu-
encies that had predominantly voted for the NDC in 1992. Briggs arguesthat this helped to retain high NDC vote shares in the 1996 elections
won by the NDC against John Kufuor and his New Patriotic Party (NPP).
The NPP, beneﬁting from a severe economic crisis, narrowly
defeated the NDC for Ghana's ﬁrst ballot-box induced power transfer
in 2000 and intensiﬁed rural electriﬁcation. In 2001, it re-launched
SHEP to construct low voltage distribution poles in villages within a dis-
tance of 20 km from the grid. Crucially, this initiative manifested demo-
cratic institutions such as strong public participation and local
leadership. Communities were encouraged to initiate own village elec-
triﬁcation projects. To maximise dissemination and policy approval, the
government required proof from communities that a minimum of one
third of communal houseswere being connected to the grid in order to re-
ceive SHEP funds for the project (Vanderpuye, 2010). Arguably, such a re-
quirement has helped the government to achieve a maximum spread of
its initiative to secure broad political backing. Throughout the decade,
SHEPwas the subject of intense electoral campaigning. It was instrumen-
tal in allowing the NES to electrify a total of 4800 communities by 2009
(Bhattacharyya, 2013). While a small regional bias exists towards the
cocoa-rich Ashanti region, no region in Ghana had an overall electriﬁca-
tion of below 49% in 2010. Remarkably, the economically least developed
northern Ghanaian region ranks at national average levels of rural electri-
ﬁcation (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012).
Economic and demographic factors
Since the 1990s, Ghana has united all positively associated variables
of rural electriﬁcation evident from the econometric analyses above.
Apart from apparent political incentives to provide rural electriﬁcation
in the face of repeated ﬁercely contested elections and effective SHEP
implementation institutions, economic and demographic factors addi-
tionally beneﬁtted Ghana's rural electriﬁcation. Its per capita income
level more than tripled between 1990 and 2010, closing the gap to the
sub-Saharan average level which stood at 50% in 1990. It managed to
amount close to double the region's average savings as GDP percentage.
The ﬁnancial source for the NES, the National Electriﬁcation Fund, was
primarily being ﬁnanced through national savings. In the 2000s,
Ghana invested considerably in a diversiﬁed electricity generation infra-
structure. Older large-scale power stations such as the Akosombo hy-
dropower plant and the Takoradi oil plant were expanded, new
facilities such as the 400MWBui hydropower plant and several smaller
fossil fuel plants were added to the grid. As a consequence, Ghana im-
ports less than 10% of its electricity. Aid dependency was halved to
less than 10% of GDP albeit a decreasing amount of conditionalities es-
pecially since the 2000s. Instead, considerable shares of local ﬁnancing
are used in rural infrastructure projects.
Herbst (2000) classiﬁes Ghana as a country with a neutral political
geography. While not high initially, Ghana's population density has al-
most doubled to more than 100 people per square kilometre between
1990 and 2010. At the same time, its rural population percentage de-
clined to close to 50%. Both of these factors have decreased the costs
of reaching close to 50% rural electriﬁcation.
Together, these political, economic and demographic factors, evident
from the econometric analyses above, suggest Ghana's remarkable rural
electriﬁcation success.
Swaziland
Rural electriﬁcation in Swaziland increased from 13% in 1990 to 21%
in 2010. While these electriﬁcation values are above the region's aver-
ages, they are considerably below average when controlling for
Swaziland's relatively high GDP per capita. Of all sub-Saharan countries
with a rural electriﬁcation of at least 10% in 1990, Swaziland has the
lowest percentage point growth in rural electriﬁcation, and ranks
among the lowest overall in terms of percent growth. Its urban electri-
ﬁcation, however, escalated from 35% in 1990 to 63% in 2010, thereby
outgrowing rural electriﬁcation by one third despite its higher base. It
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equality has grown between 1990 and 2010.10
Political factors
Swaziland's political structure between 1990 and 2010 has provided
limited incentives to electrify the rural population. The country is
governed by a modiﬁed absolute monarchy. King Mswati III has been
ruling the country since age 18 in 1986. Despite constitutional reforms
in 2005, all executive, legislative, and limited judicial powers are vested
in the king. Oppositional movements have been violently broken up in
the past, political parties remain prohibited unless they are pro-
royalist. Swaziland's Polity IV score of−9 in 2010 is the lowest in sub-
Saharan Africa. The monarchy has executed tight control of the rural
population using widespread intimidation, media control and surveil-
lance. The successful depoliticisation of the rural population has helped
to decrease governmental incentives to provide endowments to rural
areas (Motsamai, 2011). Swaziland's urban–rural divide is highly sa-
lient. Its average GINI coefﬁcient of 52.4 in the 2000s ranks it within
the top 10% of most unequal countries in the world and in sub-
Saharan Africa. Daniel (2007) asserts that the urban–rural bias is illus-
trated by Swaziland's dual land right system. A minority of mainly
urban residents enjoys freehold rights under the Title Deed Land regime
guaranteeing state-protected land ownership and trade. Yet the vast
majority of the rural population is subject to the Swazi Nation Land
leasehold system where permission to buy and sell land depends on
local chiefs or companies administering the land on behalf of the mon-
archy (Levin, 1997).
The urban–rural bias is furthermore exempliﬁed by Swaziland's con-
tinued uneven electriﬁcation. The state-owned utility company
Swaziland Electricity Company (SEC) is controlled by the Ministry of
Natural Resources and Energy (MNRE) and possesses de facto monopo-
lies on import, production and distribution of electricity. Unlike Ghana,
Swaziland does not have a designated rural electriﬁcation body. In 1997,
theMNRE commissioned a detailed feasibility study to assess rural elec-
triﬁcation in Swaziland. This study noticeably lists more negative than
positive effects of rural electriﬁcation (cf. Jansen et al., 1997). While it
acknowledges an improvement in the quality of life for the rural popu-
lation, it repeatedly warns the government against overspending on
rural electriﬁcation. The study (Jansen et al., 1997, p.11) states that
“[e]conomic feasibility (i.e. feasibility from the national-economic
point of view) should be a key pre-condition for government support
to implementation of rural electriﬁcation.” It presents unattested and
peculiar concerns of rural electriﬁcation allegedly increasing socioeco-
nomic disparities, exhibiting negative environmental effects and
slowing the implementation of renewable energies. These beliefs,
coupled with limited political incentives for rural endowments due to
the political marginalisation of the rural population and the lack of a
strong opposition, do not favour achieving electriﬁcation equality be-
tween urban and rural areas. The MNRE's 2003 National Energy Policy
has thus almost exclusively focused on urban electriﬁcation. It grew
from 43% to 63% between 2003 and 2010, compared to a modest in-
crease from 18% to 21% in rural Swaziland.
Economic and demographic factors
In comparison to other sub-Saharan African countries, Swaziland's
economic and demographic situation beneﬁts rural electriﬁcation. It is
a lower-middle income country with GDP per capita levels consistently
between double and triple of the sub-Saharan African average between
1990 and 2010. It is one of the least aid dependent countries on the con-
tinentwith a relatively diversiﬁed economy albeit a large governmental10 The other three countries are Burundi, Chad and Liberia, where rural electriﬁcation is
all but absent.sector, and national savings of more than 20% of GDP. However,
Swaziland has failed to use its income status to address rural electriﬁca-
tion. An important aspect is its neglect of investment in domestic elec-
tricity production and distribution infrastructure. Consequently, it is
forced to import 90% of its electricity and due to its unchanged high de-
mand has the highest electricity tariffs in the region (African Develop-
ment Bank, 2013). This has affected rural areas the most, both because
of the considerable urban–rural income gap and the requirement of
high voltage transmission lines to import themainly South African pro-
duced electricity, which aremainly used to connect demand hubs in cit-
ies where per capita cost are lowest. Swaziland has committed to avoid
overcharging industry at the expense of domestic users, instead
intending to not cross-subsidise tariffs (Swazi Ministry of Natural
Resources and Energy, 2003). This behaviour illustrates Brown and
Mobarak's (2009) ﬁndings which suggest that authoritarian regimes
in the presence of supply constraints tend to reduce residential provi-
sion of electricity in favour of industry through concomitant pricing
mechanisms. They see a lack of political incentives as the main reason
that prevents a differing intervention.
In terms of demographic factors, Herbst (2000) describes Swaziland
as a country with a favourable geography. Its population density is
above-median levels, with relatively short distances between highly
populated areas. While the relatively high rural population percentage
of 77% hasmadewidespread rural electriﬁcation challenging, the ability
to add 20 percentage points in urban electriﬁcation in just 7 years ren-
ders a lack of developmental and infrastructural capabilities to increase
electriﬁcation an unlikely explanation.
Thus, consistent with the econometric analysis, the Swazi experi-
ence shows that comparably high income levels alone do not neces-
sarily lead to greater electriﬁcation equality. Rather, the Swazi case
can be argued to be a lucid counterfactual of the main argument of
this paper. Had the rural Swazi population been able to politically
participate and voice their concerns instead of being marginalised,
government incentives for rural endowments may have been con-
siderably greater, especially if a strong political opposition to chan-
nel rural grievances had existed. Favourable economic and
demographic situations imply that implementing such rural endow-
ments would have been possible at least to some extent. Thus, the
absence of such a political mechanism and, instead, the presence of
different incentives for the monarchy to favour urban electriﬁcation
may have helped urban electriﬁcation to be prioritised and to out-
grow its rural counterpart.
Uganda
With rural electriﬁcation at 2% in 1990 and 5% in 2010, Uganda has
thus far been largely unable to provide access to electricity to its rural
residents. Slightly more than half of its urban population is electriﬁed,
but urban electriﬁcation growth rates have similarly been small. The
electriﬁcation inequality ratio in Uganda has therefore changed little
and stood at roughly one to ten in 2010.
Political factors
Uganda's political development between 1990 and 2010 has created
a systemof non-democratic and individualised rule supported by a large
patronage networkwhich has made it difﬁcult for ameaningful opposi-
tion to arise and represent the demands of large population shares left
out by the regime. Since 1986, President Yoweri Museveni and his Na-
tional Resistance Movement (NRM) have managed to advance a
personalisation of the state, amidst widespread intimidation of the op-
position. Museveni did not introduce multiparty elections until 2006,
and then used the permission of political parties as part of a quid pro
quo strategy to simultaneously increase presidential powers including
the lifting of term limits (Tripp, 2010). Mwenda (2007, p.24) calls
these constitutional amendments “a license for the creation of a presi-
dential monarchy.” Polity IV scores have remained negative throughout
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1996 and 2001 that securedMuseveni above two-thirdmajorities, have
been corrupted by executive-orchestrated irregularities, including ar-
resting and violently attacking opposition leaders. Consequently, there
has been no strong opposition in either of these elections. While elec-
tionsmay have functioned as a source of legitimacy, the regime's source
of power lies in Museveni's strong status and the extensive state-based
network to distribute jobs, resources, contracts, licenses and permis-
sions to political allies. Museveni used decentralisation to implement
patronage distribution, the military leadership and the cabinet have
drawn heavily from Museveni's home region in Western Uganda
(Tripp, 2010).
Important nodes of the patronage network are close to 100 semi-
autonomous government agencies, all with major ofﬁcers and boards
appointed by the government, overseeing different economic develop-
ment initiatives. The Rural Electriﬁcation Agency (REA), established
following the Electricity Act in 1999, is one of these organisations,
and it combines two common features. First, many of the agencies
have not had signiﬁcant effects on their nominal tasks.11 During
the ﬁrst 15 years of REA's existence, despite rising budgets, rural
electriﬁcation did not materialise. In its recent 10-year strategy paper,
Uganda’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (2012) ac-
knowledged this shortcoming and publicised a goal of 22% rural electri-
ﬁcation by 2022, requiring a total investment of $951 million without
additional generation investment. Yet according to its ofﬁcial 2014 ﬁ-
nancial report, the government has only budgeted a combined $85.8
million for rural electriﬁcation between 2013 and 2016, merely 22% of
what would be required to meet the target (Ugandan Ministry of Fi-
nance, 2014).
Second, the limited progress achieved has exhibited regional bias.
The 2010 Ugandan National Household Survey shows that electricity
as the primary source of lighting has increased by 48% from 4.2% in
2005 to 6.2% in 2009 in Western Uganda, while it has stagnated at
around 1.5% in Northern, and even decreased by 30% to 3.5% in Eastern
Uganda during this time (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Western
Uganda possesses a greater absolute and relative amount of high and
medium voltage electricity transmission lines. Furthermore, REA's pro-
posed strategy to reach 22% rural electriﬁcation by 2022 plans to invest
46% of regional expansion funds inWestern Uganda (UgandanMinistry
of Energy and Mineral Development, 2012), despite a relatively even
population distribution between Western, Eastern, Northern and Cen-
tral Uganda.
As a result of grossly missing the comparably modest goal of 10%
rural electriﬁcation in 2012, the government further increased the
inﬂuence of the REA. Under a “government must lead” (Ugandan
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2012, p.2) maxim, it
consolidated all private and public rural electriﬁcation initiatives
and funding within the REA. Arguably, if Uganda possessed stronger
democratic institutions that incorporated robust checks and balances
on its government aswell as public scrutiny, a further expansion of pre-
viously ineffective agencies like REA would be considerably more difﬁ-
cult to justify. If free and fair policy-oriented elections had been well-
established, acting on demands of a neglected rural electorate to
achieve tangible rural development would have most likely yielded
higher political rewards than narrowly distributing favours to political
allies.
Economic and demographic factors
Consistent with the econometric ﬁndings, Uganda's low income
levels as well as challenging demographics have further exacerbated11 Mwenda (2007) estimates that semi-autonomous agencies are funded with more
than 3% of GDP, most of these funds from international donors, yet attests them a greater
meaning for distributing individual endowments than achieving impact in their respective
ﬁelds.rural electriﬁcation. Uganda exempliﬁes that rapid GDP per capita
growth alone is not decisive for rural electriﬁcation. While the country
grew at close to 4% per capita annually between 1990 and 2000, it did
so from a small base following the economic collapse under Idi Amin
and the 1980s Bush War. In 2010, GDP per capita remained at one
third of the sub-Saharan African average.
National savings have similarly been below average. More than half
of the budget to achieve the electriﬁcation goals set out in 10-year strat-
egy paper (Uganda's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development,
2012) is ﬁnanced directly by donor aid, bypassing both the civil service
apparatus and the scrutiny of the Ugandan citizenry. Uganda is known
for being among the top recipients of conditional structural adjustment
loans in the world, leading to a considerable variety of neoliberal policy
constraints imposed on its leadership (Easterly, 2005). As only 19% of
the electriﬁcation budget comes from national funds, Uganda has effec-
tively reversed the average ratio between national and foreign funds for
power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa (Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010). Strikingly, the Ugandan government approved to
spend 18%more of its national power infrastructure funds on the Ener-
gy Ministry's “Policy, Planning and Support Services,” which mainly
comprises buying and equipping Energy Ministry and REA buildings,
than on rural electriﬁcation for the whole country combined in 2013/
14 (cf. UgandanMinistry of Finance, 2014, p. 202–3, 211–2). Limited na-
tional savings have further impeded the capital-intensive construction
of new electricity generation units in Uganda, making load shedding a
common problem across the country. Plans for the two largest hydro-
power plants in north-western Uganda, the 600 MW units in Karuma
and Ayago, have both been delayed bymore than a decade and estimat-
ed costs have signiﬁcantly increased.
Furthermore, 85% of Ugandans live in rural areas, constituting a so-
cioeconomic obstacle of comparably high costs to achieve higher rural
electriﬁcation rates. As Herbst (2000) shows, there are several areas
with considerable distances from the capital Kampala with sizeable
population densities, exacerbating a centralised electriﬁcation ap-
proach. Thus, Uganda's poor track record can be understood in light of
signiﬁcant political, economic and demographic barriers for rural elec-
triﬁcation salient in the econometric ﬁndings.
Conclusion and policy implications
This paper has presented both quantitative and qualitative evi-
dence to support its theoretically developed hypotheses. Its central
argument comprises two main points. First, the econometric and
case-example analyses show a strong positive association between
democracy and rural electriﬁcation in sub-Saharan Africa between
1990 and 2010. Rural electriﬁcation appears to be attributable to pol-
iticians' actions, a crucial prerequisite for such an association to be
meaningful. While electriﬁcation has been possible in the absence
of democratic institutions, the analyses suggest that rural electriﬁca-
tion has been more successful in sub-Saharan African states with
more democratic institutions, thereby challenging classical work on
democracy and development such as by Huntington and Nelson
(1976). The positive association is robust against a number of pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial political control variables as
well as per capita GDP and a variety of other economic and demo-
graphic variables. Democracy was also found to be positively associ-
ated with reducing rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality
markedly quicker in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, using an interven-
ing variable modelling approach, this paper has provided novel
multi-variant evidence which suggests that heavily contested elec-
tions featuring an inﬂuential opposition as well as an enhanced ef-
fectiveness of policy implementation may constitute institutional
explanations of parts of democracy's association with rural electriﬁ-
cation. The case studies further support this argument. Countries like
Ghana have been able to achieve impressive electriﬁcation gains,
where election-induced concessions delivered through well
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demographic circumstances. Where such political incentives have
been largely absent, like in Swaziland, or may have helped to estab-
lish patronage networks with narrowly deﬁned endowment recipi-
ents, like in Uganda, rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality
and rural electriﬁcation, respectively, have suffered.
Additional ﬁndings include that, not surprisingly, higher income
levels and favourable demographic factors were found to be posi-
tively associated with rural electriﬁcation. Consistent with World
Bank data supporting that over 80% of sub-Saharan Africa's power in-
frastructure is ﬁnanced through domestic funds (Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010), national savings were found to be positively asso-
ciated with rural electriﬁcation. Direct aid payments, constituting
only 6% of funds for sub-Saharan Africa's electricity infrastructure,
were found to be slightly negatively correlated with rural electriﬁca-
tion and more strongly negatively correlated with rural versus urban
electriﬁcation equality.
A number of different policy implications result from this study.
Political systems appear tomatter for rural electriﬁcation and electri-
ﬁcation inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. Fostering democratisation may
create important windfall effects via more inclusive institutional frame-
works and providing incentives for governments to improve living stan-
dards of the poor in the form of infrastructure endowments. As the
econometric analysis have suggested, such gains can be substantive.
The example of Ghana showshowparticipatory approaches in rural elec-
triﬁcation policies can signiﬁcantly beneﬁt their success, a result which
resembles VanGevelt's (2014)ﬁnding for SouthKorea. Strengthening in-
stitutional ties between the government and rural constituencies eases
the usually centrally planned approach to rural electriﬁcation, ameasure
that carries further political incentives in democracies with contested
elections.
The negative association between the rural and urban electriﬁcation
gap and foreign aid has two potential implications. First, while countries
like Thailand and South Korea have successfully used heavy state-
interventionist policies to electrify its rural population built on cross-
subsidies from large to small customers, such policies are considerably
more difﬁcult to implement for African governments subject to condi-
tional adjustment loans informed by neoliberal theories. Yet, as the
business case for rural over urban electriﬁcation is usually negative,
state interventions seem necessary to compensate for such effects as
historic examples have shown (cf. Chang, 2002). Senegal's successful
approach of using cross-subsidy schemes illustrates this implication.
Second, a re-evaluation of how aid money is spent may prove fruitful.
Non-monetary aid such as technical and educational assistance may
be more suitable for targeted infrastructure interventions as opposed
to continued funding of parastatal agencies with little track record of
success.
Furthermore, there are considerable national and sub-national vari-
ations in both electriﬁcation and the presence or absence of related
drivers and challenges across sub-Saharan Africa. As there is no quick
ﬁx to the rural electriﬁcation problem, policies should be conscious of
these variations and should iteratively tailor solutions to the complexity
of particular contexts, rather than applying broad brush dogmatic ap-
proaches with universalistic targets and timelines.Acknowledgements
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(EPSRC) as part of grant EP/M507982/1.Appendix A. Summary statistics for interpolation model
Table 7
Summary statistics and data sources for models with interpolated dependent.Variable Source Obs. Mean SD Rangeependents
Rural
electriﬁcationWorld Bank (WDI) 528 12.22 17.52 .10–.100olitics
Democracy Polity IV 468 .20 5.83 −10–10
Centralisation Gennaioli and
Rainer (2007)
462 53.73 31.76 0–100Political geography Herbst (2000) 451 1.66 .85 0–1
Indirect Rule Ziltener and Künzler
(2013)
440 .63 .48 1–3conomy
GDP per capita
(2013 103$)World Bank (WDI) 512 1.21 2.08 .07–19.71Aid (% GNI) World Bank (WDI) 489 13.12 13.20 .14–150.56
Fuel per capita
(Gtoe)IEA 524 .96 3.83 0–35.96Agriculture (%
GDP)World Bank (WDI) 489 28.10 16.56 2.14–87.90emography
Rural population
(%)World Bank (WDI) 528 64.59 15.72 14.30–94.58Population density World Bank (WDI) 528 75.47 105.80 1.72–631.00
Urbanisation (%
growth)World Bank (WDI) 528 3.97 1.97 −5.87–18.66Population (log) World Bank (WDI) 528 15.49 1.57 11.16–18.89Notes: The summary statistics above refer to models where the dependent variable has
been interpolated based on existing data. All variables other than the dependents have
been calculated as an average for each country in the two years preceding the 11 years
with available or interpolated data (1990, 92, 94, 96, 98, 2000, 02, 04, 06, 08, 2010). Miss-
ing values for particular years were omitted from the averages.
Appendix B. The Senegalese Case
Senegal's rural electriﬁcation stood at 3% in 1990, and only slightly
increased to 5% by 1997. Both ﬁgures were signiﬁcantly below the
sub-Saharan African average. Yet between 1998 and 2010, Senegal
managed to catapult rural electriﬁcation to around 30%, double the
sub-continent's average. Its urban electriﬁcation has steadily grown
from 60% to close to 90%. While still considerable, the rural versus
urban electriﬁcation ratio thereby improved from one to twenty to
one to three.
B.1. Political factors
Senegal's democratisation process with peaceful election-induced
transition of power in 2000 created incentives for the government to
electrify considerable shares of the rural population. The country
was ruled by Abdou Diouf and his Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (PS) be-
tween 1981 and 2000. Diouf took various democratisation steps in
the second half of his rule, including widespread political reforms
that granted oppositional parties more rights, levelled the electoral
playing ﬁeld and improved freedom of speech (Vengroff and
Magala, 2001). However, Diouf's poor economic track record since
1981 forced him into a runoff with Abdoulaye Wade of the main op-
positional party Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) in the 2000
general elections. While rural voters in Senegal have been found to
generally favour the incumbent (Koter, 2013), Vengroff and Magala
(2001) argue that rural opposition was fundamental in securing
Wade's win in the runoff. It constituted Senegal's ﬁrst peaceful tran-
sition of power from one party to another in elections judged free
and fair by the international community.
To solidify rural support, the PDS government was quick to greatly
expand the dedicated rural electriﬁcation agency, the Agence
Sénégalaise d'Électriﬁcation Rurale (ASER), created in 1998 by the PS
under growing political pressure of the main oppositional. The PDS
12 The World Bank reports a rural electriﬁcation rate of 4.0% for 2010, the IEA does not
provide rural electriﬁcation data for Rwanda in 2010 and instead reports 4.7% for 2012.
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tion initiatives. It set out an ambitious rural electriﬁcation target of 30%
by 2015 in 2002. Among the newly introduced initiatives were innova-
tive policies such as the Senegalese Rural Electriﬁcation Action Plan
(Plan d'Action Sénégalais d'Électriﬁcation Rurale, PASER) in 2002
(Mawhood andGross, 2014). PASER focuses on establishing concessions
via private sector participation, dividing Senegal into 18 concessions
available for competitive bidding. Private concessionaires individually
develop speciﬁc local and cost-effective electriﬁcation plans and are re-
quired to bear at least 20% of the investment cost. Similarly to the
Ghanaian case, the Senegalese government needs to centrally approve
all decentral rural electriﬁcation projects, a policy design that helps it
to ensure that broad population shares beneﬁt from electriﬁcation rath-
er than concentrating the infrastructure to support a few. Despite the
remarkable gains achieved, Mawhood and Gross (2014) point out that
the PASER policy in particular would have been more successful if gov-
ernmental effectiveness had been higher, evident in poor project man-
agement, protracted consultations and limited capacities. Despite such
criticism, success stories such as the considerable increase of rural elec-
triﬁcationmanifested the rural support for the PDS government, the lat-
ter helped secured a clear victory in the 2007 elections, albeit
oppositional allegations of electoral fraud.
B.2. Economic and demographic factors
The newly elected PDS government's move to re-nationalise the en-
ergy utility in 2000 enabled a cross-subsidy scheme ﬁnancedmainly by
the positive economic development of the country and domestic sav-
ings which greatly beneﬁted rural electriﬁcation. World Bank and IMF
conditionalities required the previous Diouf government to embark on
a privatisation-focused electricity sector reform in the late 1990s
(Gökgür and Jones, 2006). Shares of the state-owned utility SENELEC
were sold to a Canadian-French consortium which started to manage
the utility in 1999. Measures included rises in tariffs to close ﬁnancial
gaps of electricity provision, posing risks for the rural population to af-
ford electricity. After its election in 2000, the Wade government, much
to the surprise of the World Bank, was quick to buy back all SENELEC
shares to fully reverse privatisation of the utility (Gökgür and Jones,
2006). As a second push for privatisation with improved conditions
for the Senegalese governments failed, SENELEC has remained fully
state-owned. Working against World Bank and IMF loan conditions,
the government introduced a tariff-system based on a large-scale
cross-subsidising scheme to cover the deﬁcits of electriﬁcation
(Boccanfuso et al., 2008) which enabled considerably broader electriﬁ-
cation. Consistent with the econometric results in this paper, it greatly
beneﬁtted from a threefold increase of Senegalese GDP per capita levels
in the 2000s and above sub-SaharanAfricanmeannational per GDP sav-
ings, averaging 16% during the 2000s instead of relying heavily on con-
ditional aid. ASER's designated Rural Electriﬁcation Fund, much in line
forﬁgures for the sub-SaharanAfrican sub-continent, ismainly ﬁnanced
through a tax on electricity usage, functioning itself as a re-distributive
mechanism (Mawhood and Gross, 2014).
Demographic factors have posed both challenges and opportunities
for Senegal. While a quickly growing population density and a rural
population of only 55% relatively ease rural electriﬁcation, Herbst
(2000) notes that Senegal has a difﬁcult political geography where the
Southern part of the country is separated from the rest by The
Gambia. During Wade's government, a secessionist movement erupted
in the southern Casamance area.
The success of the rural electriﬁcation programme in Senegal is thus
not solely due to demographically favourable conditions and an improv-
ing economic situation, but has furthermore beneﬁted from political in-
centives for the PDS government to increase rural electriﬁcation. Cross-
subsidising policies together with private funds attracted through
PASER have helped to ﬁnance the signiﬁcant broadening of electricity
access to rural areas, reaching the ambitious 30% target in 2010, ﬁve
years earlier than planned (Bhattacharyya, 2013).Appendix C. The Rwandan case
Rural electriﬁcation in Rwanda has consistently been in the bottom
quartile of sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2010, re-
maining markedly under 5%.12 At the same time, urban electriﬁcation
has slightly increased to connect around half of urban households to
the grid, resulting in a rural versus urban electriﬁcation inequality
ratio that lies in the top quartile of sub-Saharan African countries.C.1. Political factors
The political development in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide
formed an autocratic regime built on narrow urban elites, providing po-
litical incentives for urban over broad rural electriﬁcation. Despite a rhe-
toric of democracy and national reconciliation after the genocide which
gainedwidespread support, the ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) im-
plemented a de-facto dictatorship and widespread political exclusion
(Reyntjens, 2004, 2011). After assuming a military victory to end the
genocide committed by extremist Hutus in July 1994, the RPF under
its leader Paul Kagame quickly consolidated power. In the following de-
cade, the RPF exiled, imprisoned and killed Hutu elites from early 1995,
reversed previous attempts of inclusion inside the RPF, which replaced
the largely ceremonial Hutu president Pasteur Bizimunguwith Kagame,
and banned the main opposition party, the Mouvement Démocratique
Républicain (MDR). Desrosiers and Thomson (2011) point out that
while the regime was grounded in contrary ideological narratives, the
RPF greatly favoured Tutsi, especially those who were anglophone,
with regards to access to power, income and education. While the pop-
ulation was mainly Hutu, by 1996 the vast majority of MPs, Supreme
Court judges, mayors, university students and professors, the army
and the intelligence service was Tutsi.
At the same time, “the Tutsization of urban Rwanda… had become
the sociological and economic foundation of the RPF” (Reyntjens,
2004, p.188). The Rwandan government made consistently weak bud-
getary commitments for rural development, instead favouring the
urban elite. Ansoms (2008, p.6-8) shows in-depth how “the Rwandan
government presents spending targeted at the urban elite as pro-poor
priority expenditure,” a tactic that resonates well with Desrosiers and
Thomson's (2011) analysis of the differences between benevolent lead-
ership narratives of the RPF regime elites and actual socio-political real-
ities. The banning of anymeaningful opposition (Kagamewon the 2003
presidential elections with 95.1% of the vote and an alleged turnout of
96.6%) made challenges to such urban–rural biases close to impossible
and provided no considerable incentives for rural endowments. Rural
electriﬁcation serves as a vivid example.
Studying a number of seminal government policy documents re-
veals a lack of political push for rural electriﬁcation. The government's
“Rwanda Vision 2020” issued in 2000 does not feature rural electriﬁca-
tion as a priority area (Republic of Rwanda, 2000). The document does
not include a rural electriﬁcation goal. It only states that it aims to elec-
trify 25% of its population by 2010 (a goal the government has missed
by more than 50%), and 35% of the population by 2020. However, as
electriﬁcation in urban areas is considerably more cost effective,
reaching a such broadly deﬁned goal implies an almost automatic
focus on urban over rural electriﬁcation. Similarly, the Ministry of
Infrastructure's Electricity Access Rollout Programme (EARP) started
in 2009does not distinguish between urban and rural electriﬁcation tar-
gets either but implicitly favours urban centres for electriﬁcation. The
government's 2013 IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) re-
peats the de-prioritisation of rural electriﬁcation in a more lucid way.
It asserts that electriﬁcation, at the time still at only 14% of the total
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productive use of energy and those who can afford to pay for the cost-
covering connection fee” (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.51–52), and
that “the levels of consumption for some are too low to justify a grid
connection” (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.40). Its vague claims to use
decentralised technologies on a large scale for rural areas is not based
on any signiﬁcant experience with the technology in Rwanda or the
greater region and would require enormous technological leapfrogging
within a few years to become a reality.13 It is thus not surprising that the
electriﬁcation gains achieved by the EARP by 2013, an increase to 16% of
overall electricity access, are largely limited to urban areas (Republic of
Rwanda, 2013). Yet the Rwandan government chose to increase its
overall electricity access target to 70% by 2017, a magnitude which
may again be best understood in light of Desrosiers and Thomson's
(2011) work on the high importance of maintaining benevolent leader-
ship narratives for the RPF regime elites towards the international com-
munity (the IMF in this case) and its own population, regardless of how
meaningful they are on the ground.C.2. Economic and demographic factors
While favourable demographics have aided the rapid consolidation
of power, income declines have forced the Rwandan regime to trade-
off different options where to spend its energy infrastructure budget.
GDP per capita has been considerably below the sub-Saharan African
average. Income per capita levels fell in the 1990s, mainly driven by
the halving of GDP in a single year during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
National savings in Rwanda are well below sub-Saharan African aver-
ages, exacerbating the usage of the usually domestic chancel to ﬁnance
electriﬁcation infrastructure. With increasing industrialisation in urban
areas, Rwanda has experienced severe electricity supply shortages due
to failure to invest in new generation capacity (Safari, 2010). The cost
of electricity increased by 900% between 1995 and 2006, deeming elec-
tricity largely economically inaccessible for the majority of the poor
population, especially where ﬂexible payment schemes are absent
(Van Gevelt et al., 2016). Resource allocation for electriﬁcation infra-
structure has favoured urban over rural areas, keeping the urban versus
rural electriﬁcation high.
At the same time, the donor community has regarded Rwanda as a
‘donor darling’ and ensured greatly above regional average aid payments
despite the country's signiﬁcant human rights abuses (Reyntjens, 2011).
Up to 50% of the national budget were aid ﬁnanced, thereby bypassing
the scrutiny of the Rwandan people, a situation exacerbated by the ab-
sence of political opposition which could have exercised potential
checks and balances.
The favourable geographic conditions have helped the RPF to effec-
tively concentrate power, yet have not furthered rural electriﬁcation
challenges. Rwanda has the highest population density of all continen-
tal sub-Saharan African countries at 439 people per square kilometre in
2010. Its rural population share, while still high at around 75% in 2010,
has decreased at the fastest absolute rate of all sub-Saharan African
countries, apparent in its considerable urbanisation rates. Herbst
(2000) classiﬁes Rwanda as a country with favourable political geogra-
phy. Centralised control over the country, a beneﬁcial factor for state-
driven electriﬁcation programmes, is greatly eased by its demographic
conditions. It allowed Kagame and his regime to consolidate political
power relatively quickly after the genocide and aided the regime in
building a pervasive bureaucratic apparatus. Gennaioli and Rainer
(2007) calculate a pre-colonial political centralisation index of close to
1, indicating that state control in Rwanda has traditionally been
centralised.13 In fact, such decentralised renewable technologies, despite their signiﬁcant potential
in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to play a miniscule role for the electricity generation mix
on the sub-continent.While these geographic conditions favour large-scale state-
driven electriﬁcation programmes in general, such initiatives tend
to require political commitment to be extended to the rural popula-
tion. Yet, in the context of considerable economic constraints, the
well-consolidated Rwandan regime's urban-based elite system of
patronage (Green, 2011) has worked to substantially de-prioritise
rural electriﬁcation over elite endowments in the absence of democracy
and a strong opposition. This provides a lucid political counterfactual
case to the econometric analysis in this paper, as arguably a context of
contested elections in a strong democracy would have forced the RPF
to lend more credibility to its ﬁctional claims to inclusion by reversing
its salient urban and elite bias in endowment allocation.References
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